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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
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Disasters are momentous events in the history of a place. They are momentous 
in people’s memories, as well as momentous in the changes that occur in the built 
environment of the place. Recent disasters such as Hurricane Katrina on the Gulf Coast 
in 2005, Hurricane Hugo in Charleston, South Carolina in 1989, and the 1989 Loma 
Prieta and 1994 Northridge earthquakes in California have left shattered lives and 
landscapes. The field of historic preservation studies history and memory in order to 
establish levels of significance in the landscape of the built environment. The field of 
disaster management studies hazards, risks, response, and recovery in order to 
minimize trauma and loss after a disaster. These two fields overlap in many ways, and 
the purpose of this thesis is to examine the integration of historic preservation into the 
field of disaster management, and also to examine the integration of disaster 
management considerations into the fields of historic preservation, planning, and 
architecture. 
The thesis approaches the field of historic preservation through the structure of 
the social science-oriented field of disaster study. Disaster policies can be very different 
in different countries; therefore, this thesis is a study of disaster management and 
historic preservation policy in only the United States, although it uses historical examples 
from various countries to examine basic principles of the different ways that places 
respond to disasters and choose to rebuild. Disaster preparedness, response, and 
recovery all require extensive collaboration among professionals from various fields. 
These professionals may not ever work together in their daily operations, but in planning 
for disasters, or in the actual event of a disaster, they must work together toward the 
common goal of recovery of a place and a population after a tragedy. 
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In the past, historic preservation has not been integrated into the field of disaster 
management, which is primarily concerned with protecting human life and restoring 
basic services that support life and settlement immediately after a disaster. Historic 
preservation, and more generally, the treatment of property during and after a disaster, 
has been rightly viewed as a secondary consideration to the much more important 
priority of preserving human life. In the last decade, however, as the fields of both 
historic preservation and disaster management have matured and have become more 
sophisticated, professionals in the two fields have recognized the need for increased 
collaboration. There has been a realization that the preservation and protection of 
cultural resources is important in the mental and emotional rebuilding of a place; the 
unnecessary destruction of cultural resources after disasters causes unnecessary 
emotional distress and pain. 
Professionals in the field of historic preservation as well as society in general 
have long recognized the need for preservation of monumental architecture. However, 
disasters are not discriminate and do not only affect monumental buildings, but also 
vernacular houses, streetscapes, and cultural landscapes. This thesis discusses 
preservation policies and disaster policies with respect to these more vulnerable 
vernacular resources. These types of resources are extremely vulnerable to damage or 
loss in a disaster situation. They are, in general, constructed of more fragile materials 
than large-scale public architecture and in many cases do not have dedicated disaster 
managers who can administratively either plan and prepare for a disaster or manage a 
recovery from a disaster. 
Vernacular resources may not be listed individually on a local historic register or 
the National Register of Historic Places, and therefore not formally recognized as 
significant. They could then be easily overlooked by professionals executing disaster 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  4 
 
recovery who are not trained in historic preservation, and even by preservation 
professionals themselves with the lack of administrative integrity for this type of 
resource. These resources, though fragile, are extremely important in the recovery of a 
place after a disaster. Each small component of a historic district, landscape, or cultural 
landscape contributes to the sense of a place as an ensemble, and the loss of any 
component, no matter how small or seemingly insignificant, has a negative effect on the 
character of the place.  
The thesis begins by discussing general definitions of a disaster in Chapter 2 and 
the importance of cultural resources in the rebuilding process. This chapter explains the 
vulnerability of cultural resources post-disaster, especially the vulnerabilities of 
vernacular architecture and neighborhoods, then identifies research gaps in disaster 
studies and cultural resource management. Chapter 3 theorizes about factors that 
influence the recovery of places after disasters, specifically the application of broad 
disaster preparedness and response theories to planning, preservation, and 
architecture. It uses examples from historical disasters to examine these factors and 
how they relate to preservation specifically. 
Chapter 4 outlines basic disaster management principles and discusses the 
history of disaster policy and preservation policy in the United States and how the two 
fields overlap under current policies. Chapter 5 examines the role of federal agencies 
such as FEMA and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation in disaster 
management, and additionally explores the role of national non-governmental 
organizations such as the National Trust for Historic Preservation and the American 
Planning Association in disasters. Chapter 6 outlines the role of state and local 
governments and organizations. It uses Hurricane Katrina as an example to emphasize 
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the close relationships among federal, state, and local entities that are necessary in the 
disaster management process. 
The last chapter of the thesis draws conclusions on the integration of disaster 
management and historic preservation and suggests topics for further research. Perhaps 
the most important conclusion of the research is that the response to a disaster and its 
negative effects on cultural resources such as vernacular architecture are vastly 
improved by adequate and systematic preparation for such events. The lack of a 
response plan can be deadly for cultural resources, and therefore the collective memory, 
history, and culture of communities. The individual and social fabric and life of a place is 
already disrupted by the event of a disaster, and the loss of historic resources can 
compound the loss and make it more devastating. Conversely the preservation of 
cultural resources post-disaster can provide comfort and assist in the mental and 
emotional recovery of a population. Preservationists do not automatically include 
disaster preparedness in their everyday efforts to care for cultural resources such as 
buildings, districts, and landscapes. However, as preservation or maintenance work is 
done, the disaster hazards, risks, and vulnerabilities should be evaluated and mitigation 
actions taken. 
A significant problem in the disaster recovery process is not only that 
preservationists do not consider disasters, but also that disaster managers do not 
automatically include historic preservation considerations in their efforts. Many are 
unaware of the negative effects that the loss of historic fabric has on places. Even 
professionals in the fields of planning and architecture, which are closely related to 
preservation, in many cases do not include preservation in their disaster planning or 
rebuilding efforts. Decisions that are made immediately following a disaster (during the 
short-term recovery phase) can needlessly destroy historic fabric and cultural resources. 
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Such destruction is not reversible, and decisions about what to save and what to 
demolish should be given adequate consideration before action is taken. Preservation 
professionals should be involved early in the recovery process in order to include cultural 
resources in the options for the future of the place. 
These conclusions were reached through an examination of current federal 
disaster and preservation policies. Additionally, national, state, and local preservation 
and disaster organizations were studied for their overlapping roles in the treatment of 
cultural resources with respect to disasters. This thesis answers the basic question of 
how preservation and disaster policy and organizations overlap, but raises many more 
questions for the future as both professions struggle with the recovery of the Gulf Coast 
after Hurricane Katrina, and will undoubtedly experience many more devastating 
disasters in the future. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
DISASTERS AND CULTURAL RESOURCES 
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The Inevitability of Disasters and Destruction 
 The word “disaster” is defined by the Encarta Dictionary as “an event that causes 
serious loss, destruction, hardship, unhappiness, or death.” Another more specific 
definition of disaster was written by Charles Fritz, a pioneer in social science disaster 
studies, in 1961: 
…an event, concentrated in time and space, in which a society, or a 
relatively self-sufficient subdivision of a society, undergoes severe danger 
and incurs such losses to its members and physical appurtenances that 
the social structure is disrupted and the fulfillment of all or some of the 
essential functions of the society is prevented. (Fritz 1961, 655, as stated 
in Mileti 1999, 210) 
 
These two definitions encompass both man-made and natural disasters including 
hurricanes, war, floods, civil disturbances and riots, nuclear accidents, landslides, 
economic depression or disinvestment, plane crashes, and even some urban renewal 
projects. In a more basic sense, a disaster is an event that causes destruction to the 
built environment—the places in which humans live, work, and recreate. Just as quickly 
as people build roads, buildings, and parks, there are forces such as wind, hail, 
economics, and political conflicts that destroy them. These forces are inevitable, and 
because of the pain that they cause, people will always study them and work to prevent 
them and mitigate their damage. Carl Nelson states this inevitability succinctly: “the 
question is not if, but when and where, disaster will strike next” (Nelson 1991, 36). 
 
The Importance of Cultural Resources Post-Disaster 
 Disasters that change our built environment are traumatic. For thousands of 
years, humans have chosen to settle the world in patterns, creating meaning in the built 
environment of our inhabited places (Atkin and Rykwert 2005, 1). Because of these 
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established meanings, when a disaster occurs and changes our immediate 
surroundings, it devastates not only the physical fabric of the place, but also the 
meaning of the place, and therefore our sense of belonging and meaning. The FEMA 
guide, Integrating Historic Property and Cultural Resource Considerations into Hazard 
Mitigation Planning, states, “Whether a disaster impacts a major community museum, a 
historic ‘main street,’ or collections of family photographs, the sudden loss of historic 
properties and cultural resources can negatively impact a community's character and 
economy, and can affect the overall ability of the community to recover from a disaster 
event” (FEMA 2005, 1). 
 The negative impacts of a disaster on culture and character mentioned above are 
difficult to define. In the aftermath of a disaster, people naturally look for remnants of the 
familiar in order to cope with unexpected trauma. For example, the realization that a 
beloved landmark was destroyed can add to the pain of the disaster, and conversely, the 
realization that a landmark was spared can add hope to the recovery process. Post-
disaster, the material objects that remain can be vehicles of recovery and can help 
restore stability where it has been shattered. Historic preservationists, as cultural 
resource professionals, are trained to work with the public to help determine value and 
significance in the built environment, and therefore can be invaluable in allocating 
resources in the rebuilding process as well as providing advice to the public on methods 
of repair to historic buildings and landscapes that will preserve as much of the meaning 
of the place as possible. 
 The scope of the field of historic preservation has evolved and broadened over 
time from focusing on simply preserving specific buildings and historic districts to 
studying and preserving landscapes and cultural landscapes as well. Cultural 
landscapes are composed of the connections between elements of the built environment 
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such as vernacular architecture, streetscapes, small businesses, and open space and 
the memories and history attached to the built environment. Cultural landscapes 
recognize the present “working landscapes” that represent continuity and evolution of 
human interaction with the land. This newer, broader scope of preservation directly 
applies to disaster management, as preservationists today are not only interested in 
preserving or rebuilding individual buildings that are damaged in events such as fires, 
but also facilitating preservation of landscapes and cultural landscapes that may be 
damaged by larger-scale disasters such as flooding, forest fires, earthquakes, and 
tornados. In the case of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, elements of the built 
environment such as levees and canals are themselves important components of the 
cultural landscape, as they were the components of the built environment that failed and 
caused much of the flooding disaster. 
 Memories and history attach meaning to landscapes and are much more difficult 
to assess and repair post-disaster than the wood or bricks of a particular building. 
Materials can be replaced, and costs can be estimated for a certain type of repair to a 
building, but it is difficult to attach a monetary replacement value to a beautiful tree or a 
house that is significant because a prominent person lived there. However, preserving or 
restoring elements of the physical built environment can help to preserve the memories 
and history of a cultural landscape; the restoration of the physical remains can be an 
asset in the emotional and social recovery process. Therefore policy dealing with culture 
is necessary post-disaster. 
 
Research Gaps in Disaster Studies and Cultural Resource Management 
 Disasters are an urgent public issue, and with their frequent occurrence, one 
might expect that disaster preparedness and recovery has been widely studied. In some 
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areas of research, this is true. The field of disaster studies is a specialty to which entire 
professional degrees in social fields are devoted1. The volumes and articles which have 
been written on the topic fill libraries. It is a multi-disciplinary field that involves 
researchers and practitioners in fields including ecology, geology, geography, history, 
engineering, architecture, planning, psychology, sociology, medical administration, 
economics, and government policy, as well as many other specialties. 
 There are generally two approaches to disaster research. The first is research on 
the different natural hazards that exist on the earth such as volcano eruptions, 
earthquakes, or hurricanes. This type of research is generally performed by physical 
scientists such as geologists, meteorologists, and geographers. It includes projects such 
as analyzing a particular place for its inherent hazards, or determining the probability of 
a certain type of disaster occurring in a particular place, such as the probability that an 
earthquake of a certain magnitude will occur in northern California within a certain 
number of years. The second type of disaster research is focused on emergency 
preparedness, response, and recovery and is most often studied by social scientists. An 
example of this type of research is measuring housing loss after a disaster and 
developing policies for restoring housing to a disaster-devastated area (Tierney 2001, 
22-3). 
                                                 
1 Numerous colleges and universities across the country offer bachelors and masters degrees in 
fields such as Emergency, Crisis, and Disaster Management and Homeland Security. The 
University of North Carolina offers a curriculum in “Community Preparedness and Disaster 
Management” with a certificate program and plans for Associates, Bachelor’s, and Masters 
degrees in Disaster Management. George Washington University offers a Master of Science in 
Engineering Management and Systems Engineering with a concentration in Crisis, Emergency 
and Risk Management as well as a Graduate Certificate in Homeland Security Emergency 
Preparedness and Response and Emergency Management and Public Health. For a complete 
listing of colleges, universities, and institutions offering Emergency Management courses, see 
FEMA’s “Emergency Management Institute” website: 
http://www.training.fema.gov/emiweb/edu/collegelist/ 
CHAPTER 2: DISASTERS AND CULTURAL RESOURES 12 
 
 There are multiple intersections between disaster study and physical design, 
which includes the fields of architecture, landscape architecture, city planning, and 
historic preservation. Planners approach the field of disaster study from the standpoint of 
long-term sustainability. They work on planning cities to be more resistant to disasters by 
identifying hazards such as flood plains or earthquake faults, and planning uses for 
these geographical features such as parks or open space that would sustain less 
damage than housing or commercial buildings in the event of a disaster. Architects and 
engineers study methods of designing or retrofitting buildings to be disaster resistant. 
They are constantly devising new methods of flood-proofing buildings and making them 
more resistant to the forces of earthquakes, for example. In the disaster recovery phase, 
planners, architects, and preservationists are essential in assessing damage and 
advising property owners as well as public officials on rebuilding efforts. 
 This thesis studies the intersections of disasters and design by researching 
historic preservation, planning, and disaster policies, analyzing their application in past 
disasters, and applying the current policies to current disasters. It places specific 
emphasis on the relationships between disaster managers and planners, 
preservationists, and designers, in order to bridge gaps between different disciplines and 
hopefully promote better communication and coordination among the professionals, 
stakeholders, and leaders all involved in the messy disaster preparation and recovery 
process. 
 In the field of historic preservation, there are some specific areas of study related 
to disaster planning and response that have been widely researched and published, and 
others that have not. There are publications on the management of historic sites such as 
museums, but not on disaster management and historic districts or cultural landscapes. 
Historic preservation has some roots in and therefore strong connections to the fields of 
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museum studies and conservation of objects. As a result, there are numerous articles 
and books published by organizations such as the Getty Conservation Institute 
describing the process of disaster preparation and response for managers of museums 
or historical sites. Objects and buildings can be quickly damaged or even eliminated by 
events such as fire and floods; they are particularly prone to loss of value due to these 
disasters. Therefore, great measures are taken to protect museum objects such as fire 
suppression systems, fire detection systems, and elaborate disaster preparedness plans 
and training. There is also published research on the treatment of individual buildings 
with respect to disasters. Books and articles have been written on methods for refitting 
buildings to make them more resistant to the forces of earthquakes or floods. 
 There has been far less research, however, on larger geographic areas of 
cultural resources such as historic districts, landscapes, and cultural landscapes. One 
possible reason for this lack of research is that historic districts have no designated 
historic preservation manager or caretaker. Historic districts have been a focus of 
preservation for decades, but after an area is designated a National Historic District 
there is no requirement in federal policy for the district to be managed or maintained. 
This problem of a lack of administrative integrity for certain types of cultural resources 
means that there is less focus on them with respect to preservation research. 
 It is much easier for preservationists, and the public in general, to identify 
landmark architecture as a priority in rebuilding and focus resources on this type of 
cultural resource rather than historic districts. The decisions of what to save, what to 
rebuild, and what to demolish after a disaster depend on many factors such as 
economics, extent of damage, and material and cultural value. The highly valued 
landmarks of a settlement are almost always recognized as a priority for rebuilding. The 
rebuilding of such landmarks serves as a symbol to all that even after a disaster, the 
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place remains, and the people also persevere. However, in addition to damage to major 
individual landmarks, damage to other parts of the familiar environment of local 
neighborhoods, or the destruction of all or part of the ensemble such neighborhoods 
represent, can be just as devastating. This is an important intersection between historic 
preservation, especially preservation planning, and disaster studies, and one on which 
only limited study has been focused. 
 
The Vulnerability of Cultural Resources Post-Disaster 
 There are certain forms in our built environment that are more vulnerable to the 
forces of a disaster than others. Some types of buildings are stronger than others in 
withstanding disaster forces. Large, public buildings that are constructed of high quality 
masonry and/or steel usually fare much better than smaller vernacular buildings that are 
of light masonry or timber-framed construction. Additionally, the pre-disaster condition or 
maintenance of the building is a factor in how well it fares during the disaster; those that 
are occupied and in relatively good repair prior to a disaster can withstand stronger 
forces than buildings that were abandoned and/or in poor condition prior to a disaster. 
Also, landscapes and vegetation are particularly susceptible to damage or destruction by 
wind or flooding; many species of trees and vegetation do not fare well under strong 
forces such as high winds and flooding. Landscapes also can take much more time to 
restore than a building; 100-year old live oaks take 100 years to grow to the size that 
they were prior to a disaster. 
 Historic districts and cultural landscapes are assets that are extremely vulnerable 
to damage in disaster events. They are typically composed of many elements and may 
be in various states of repair. They are generally more vernacular cultural resources that 
are constructed of lighter materials. They are generally privately owned, in contrast to 
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larger public buildings such as libraries or schools, and their maintenance is subject to 
the income level and/or skill of the owner. In many cases individual public buildings such 
as courthouses are much better maintained than historic districts that contain many 
abandoned buildings and are inhabited by lower-income residents. It is quite common 
that destruction is distributed unevenly in a community; neighborhoods that are older or 
in states of disrepair or that serve lower-income residents and business owners may 
suffer disproportionately higher losses (Schwab et al. 1998, 89). Also, trees and 
vegetation are character-defining features in some historic districts as well as certain 
other landscape elements such as rows of streetlights or benches. These types of 
elements are particularly susceptible to wind and flood damage and are difficult to 
replace, once lost. 
 Administrative integrity, again, is another reason that historic districts are 
vulnerable to damage and/or loss post-disaster. When no agency or person is 
specifically designated to care for a district, individual property owners conduct their own 
post-disaster assessments, make their own decisions about what to demolish and what 
to keep, and consequently, integrity of the district could be lost. One other vulnerability of 
historic districts post-disaster is the inevitable tension that exists between historic 
preservation and rebuilding. People want to return order to a disorderly place and return 
their lives to “normal” after a disaster as quickly as possible, and it takes time for 
preservationists to evaluate significance and time for planners and public officials to 
work with the public to determine priorities and a vision for rebuilding. It is difficult for 
planning and preservation to be effective when they are forced into being reactive. They 
are by nature careful and analytic professions. In the absence of a well-thought-out pre-
disaster recovery plan, preservation and planning, when forced by circumstance into 
reactive stances, can be seen as obstacles to rebuilding. 
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 In addition, government agencies often put deadlines on monetary grants for 
demolition or repair, which force property owners to make decisions very quickly on 
whether and/or how to rebuild. Decisions can be made early in the recovery process that 
destroy cultural resources and severely limit future decisions about the character of the 
place. Consequently, the very thing that can restore continuity and structure to people’s 
lives—the stability of the surrounding cultural resources and environment—is in grave 
danger of being unnecessarily lost. 
 In his 1999 book, Disasters by Design, Dennis Mileti makes this point about post-
disaster planning which is directly related to preservation: 
After disasters, critical policy choices emerge, forcing unwelcome 
decisions on local government about whether to rebuild quickly or safely. 
Postdisaster recovery and reconstruction planning and management 
commonly reflect an effort to balance certain ideal objectives with reality. 
Recovery is characterized by wanting to (1) rapidly return to normal, (2) 
increase safety, and (3) improve the community…Real decisions are 
likely to be severely limited by economic pressure and pressure to decide 
quickly. The pressures to restore normalcy in response to victims’ needs 
and desires are so strong that safety and community improvement 
goals—modifying land use, retrofitting damaged buildings, creating new 
parks, or widening existing streets—are often compromised or 
abandoned. (Mileti 1999, 233) 
 
Therefore, it is important to identify very early in the rebuilding process, or even earlier in 
pre-disaster planning, which physical material resources have cultural meaning in a 
community. This can help prevent rapid decisions that in the long run can be more 
harmful to the recovery and rebuilding efforts. Many places do this in the form of 
comprehensive preservation plans or dedicated campaigns to evaluate the cultural 
resources of the place. Some places value preservation more and put more resources 
into such an evaluation. Others do not, and after a disaster when decisions must be 
made quickly, there is often not enough time for a thoughtful evaluation of cultural 
resources. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
FACTORS IN DISASTER RECOVERY 
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 Several factors that are either directly or indirectly related to preservation, 
planning, and architecture influence how and how quickly a place recovers after a 
disaster:  
• Type of disaster and scale of destruction 
• Nature of place affected 
• Type or quality of leadership 
• Amount of planning and training pre-disaster 
• Sustainability of the place 
These factors are described below in general disaster management terms, and also 
specifically with respect to planning, preservation, and architecture. 
 It is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify whether a particular recovery action is 
“successful” in the rebuilding process. For many disciplines, success must be measured 
quantitatively. This is an inherent problem in disaster studies; different professions, let 
alone different people, have different ideas of the best way to return lives to normal 
following a disaster, and therefore have different definitions of disaster “recovery.” 
Additionally, different types of people use different timelines to measure post-disaster 
recovery; some types of recovery are accomplished much more quickly then others. For 
example, in come cases it is possible to rebuild an individual building much faster than 
rebuilding a shattered economy. Success in cultural recovery can be measured in terms 
of economic recovery, psychological recovery, the vibrancy of a neighborhood, or the 
physical rebuilding of fabric in buildings or roads. Another problem in studying the effects 
of actions in disaster recovery is that disaster losses tend to be quantified in monetary 
units, but there are many types of losses that are not monetarily quantifiable. Examples 
are the loss of a human life, the loss of a beach, unrecoverable time for children in 
school, or psychological trauma (Pielke and Pielke 1997, 135). Loss of cultural 
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resources is another type of loss that is difficult to measure in monetary units. The loss 
of an historic building cannot be quantified by its tax assessed value prior to a disaster; 
an historic building has more value than just the money in its materials. The loss of an 
entire neighborhood and the physical and social patterns it embodies is another 
significant intangible loss. 
 One measure of “recovery” after disasters that is specific to historic preservation 
is the rebuilding/restoration of cultural resources such as buildings. Another additional 
goal is the successful preservation of as much pre-disaster character as possible, 
whether this be the preservation of character-defining architectural elements or 
landscape elements or even character-defining uses such as restoring corner stores to 
corner store buildings or residents to residential buildings. Another guiding principle for 
preservationists is that change cannot, and should not, be prevented, but only managed. 
Part of managing the change that is inherent in disasters is rebuilding neighborhoods 
while allowing the disaster to become a part of the collective memory of the place. This 
can be done by memorializing the event in some formal way, such as constructing a 
dedicated memorial, or memorializing the event simply by preserving the clues and cues 
of the rebuilt environment such as newer buildings interspersed with older buildings. 
 Memorials for more somber events such as war, slavery, or natural disasters 
take many forms, but the presence of a physical memorial in any form can be the vehicle 
or medium that connects the present and future to the past events that have helped to 
shape our culture. Natural disasters are important events in history, and memorials to 
these events can reinforce that significance. Therefore in historic preservation, “cultural 
success” following a disaster can perhaps be defined as not only the retention of as 
many cultural resources (such as buildings or museums) as possible, but the 
management of the changes in the historic built environment in order to facilitate the 
CHAPTER 3: FACTORS IN DISASTER RECOVERY 20 
 
healing process of its residents. During this process the disaster becomes part of the 
collective memory; rebuilding does not obliterate it, but merely adds another layer to 
memory. 
 
Type of disaster and scale of destruction 
A somewhat obvious factor in the recovery of places is the type and scale of the 
disaster. There are many different types of disasters. In general they can be categorized 
as either those caused by natural hazards or events (volcanic eruptions, tornados, and 
earthquakes, for example), those caused by deliberate acts such as war, terrorism, or 
property neglect, or disasters caused by accidents such as plane crashes or 
technological disasters like chemical spills or nuclear accidents. In general, natural 
events such as hurricanes that affect uninhabited areas are not considered human 
disasters even though they can be considered a “disaster” to the natural landscape of 
vegetation or animals. For the purposes of this thesis, a disaster is defined as a collision 
of an event with people, or with people’s property; certainly disasters such as hurricanes 
that damage ecosystems but not inhabited areas are still disasters, but will not be 
addressed here. 
In general, people react to damage to their built environment somewhat 
differently based on whether the damage was due to a purely natural event or whether it 
was a deliberate or man-made cause. In some types of disasters such as war or other 
political conflicts, landmarks in the built environment are deliberately destroyed in order 
to cause emotional devastation; there is a specific meaning in the destruction. There are 
numerous examples of this throughout time ranging from the razing of the ancient city of 
Carthage to the destruction of the World Trade Center in New York in 2001 to the 
bombing of an important Shiite mosque in Iraq in 2006. In these cases, people as a part 
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of the grieving process experience strong feelings of anger and hostility towards other 
people. In order to make statements of societal or political resiliency there is a tendency 
to rebuild an area quickly as well as “bigger and better” than it was before the disaster. 
In the case of intentional acts, people want to create meaning in the rebuilding process, 
which can result in a transformation of place. Such was the case in several European 
cities after the world wars in the early to mid-twentieth century such as Rotterdam and 
Plymouth, England. Additionally, places that are rebuilt almost as exact replicas also 
transform place. Warsaw, Poland was such an example after the destruction of World 
War II. Even in places that have been completely rebuilt in a new form, there are 
examples of certain iconic reminders of the disaster being retained. The city of Plymouth 
stabilized and preserved the bombed-out shell of a church as a reminder of the 
devastation of the bombings. A church in Delaware preserved its charred keystone when 
the entire structure had to be rebuilt following a devastating fire. Hiroshima, Japan, has 
preserved reminders of the devastation of an atomic bomb, while rebuilding the city. 
Another effect of deliberate events such as terrorist attacks or war is that national 
support is stirred; the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were seen not as an attack 
against New Yorkers, but an attack on the United States, and therefore national aid 
flowed into the city for the recovery and rebuilding efforts, though the effectiveness of 
this large-scale response remains to be seen. In contrast, disasters such as the Exxon 
oil spill in Alaska were seen as a result of negligence or human error on the part of 
Exxon personnel, and therefore economic and environmental cleanup was mostly seen 
as the responsibility of Exxon.  
The categorizing of disasters is more difficult when damage is caused by a 
combination of natural hazards and man-made vulnerabilities. In many cases, disasters 
expose human inadequacies or deficiencies in design or engineering. The damage to 
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New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina is one example where damage was seemingly 
initiated by a natural event (Hurricane Katrina), but then flooding was actually caused by 
human mismanagement of the maintenance of the levee system. The hurricane did 
cause high storm surges, but then these storm surges rushed up canals and exposed 
levees to extreme forces. The levees were poorly-maintained, and were breached, 
causing most of the serious flooding in New Orleans. Therefore the damage was caused 
by a combination of the natural hazard of storm surges and the man-made vulnerability 
of poorly-maintained, and perhaps even poorly designed and constructed levees. In the 
case of Katrina, millions of dollars of aid have been sent to the Gulf Coast, however 
many residents still do not have the ability to return to their houses and lives. When aid 
is poorly managed after a disaster, even millions of dollars may not get residents the 
relief they need. 
One last comparison in how the type of event affects the type of preparedness 
and response is the comparison between events that are expected (such as some types 
of natural disasters like flooding in a river floodplain), and events that are unpredictable 
(such as some acts of terrorism). It is very difficult if not impossible to predict where 
terrorist acts will occur, and therefore more difficult to plan and mitigate such events. It is 
somewhat easier to plan for natural disasters such as flooding and hurricanes that are 
relatively predictable. 
 
Nature of place affected 
 Factors that affect the disaster planning and recovery of a place are its size (area 
as well as population density) and its economy. Disasters affect rural areas and urban 
centers in very different ways. Relocation from smaller places has more obvious and 
apparent impact; the town of Valmeyer, Illinois almost completely relocated to higher 
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ground when it was flooded by the Mississippi River in 1993. Population centers with 
hundreds of thousands, or millions of people in some ways seem to withstand disasters 
like flooding more easily and have less of a tendency to completely relocate. Therefore 
in general larger settlements seem to be more able to absorb large-scale disasters, or 
be more disaster-resilient than smaller settlements. 
 The state of the economy in a place pre-disaster also has large implications for 
how and how quickly the place will recover. Places with healthy economies will in 
general recover more quickly, and in the same or similar form that they were before the 
disaster, than places that were in economic decline prior to the disaster. The cities of 
London and Chicago both experienced large-scale fires (in 1666 and 1871, respectively) 
that destroyed large portions of their urban fabric. Both cities were experiencing 
economic stability or growth, and both cities rebuilt quickly, maintaining in large part their 
pre-disaster grids of streets and blocks, but transforming their identities while 
simultaneously absorbing the disaster into their perspective sense of place. 
 Certain places chose to capitalize on widespread destruction as an opportunity to 
make large-scale changes in the built environment. The cities of London and Chicago 
are also examples of this; although they retained their basic street grids, they took the 
opportunity to create enormously ambitious rebuilding plans, overhauled their 
architectural vocabularies and, and presented themselves as cities transformed. These 
types of transforming decisions are also made in either smaller settlements such as 
Valmeyer, or in places that were in economic decline such as Plymouth, England. 
Following massively destructive World War II blitzes in 1940-1, the city of Plymouth 
chose to demolish large portions of its medieval, crowded, and unsanitary working-class 
neighborhoods in order to construct a grand, axial commercial center containing modern, 
wide boulevards and streets. 
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Type or quality of leadership 
The way a place rebuilds after a disaster is directly related to the quality of 
leadership in the rebuilding process. Some places have very strong governmental 
leaders who are able to take charge in a crisis situation and effect swift recoveries. An 
example of strong leadership following a disaster is the mayor’s role in the rebuilding of 
Kobe, Japan after a devastating earthquake in 1994.  Kobe mayor, Kazutoshi Sasayama 
made an immediate decision to institute a moratorium on rebuilding in order to 
accomplish extensive city planning. This decision meant that residents were displaced 
for years, but Sasayama’s insistence on creating open space to protect buildings from 
future earthquakes and fires was a long-term success for the city. This type of strong, 
and in some ways unpopular, decision-making by governmental leaders worked in 
Japan, where government is more authoritarian than in the United States. In contrast, 
New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin has not made strong decisions about the planning and 
rebuilding of the city; these decisions can be extremely unpopular with residents who are 
displaced and want to return to their homes as soon as possible—and who vote in 
mayoral elections. 
In order to have good leadership, there must be of course not only good leaders, 
but also a high level of trust between leaders and the people they lead. This can be 
called the quality or nature of the “followership.” If people have a high opinion of their 
leaders prior to a disaster and trust in their decision-making abilities, they will be able to 
trust these same leaders after a disaster to make good decisions. The decisions of these 
leaders will not be questioned as much and will therefore be much more effective than 
those of a leader who had low approval before a disaster. In that case, the leader’s 
decisions will be questioned and therefore the recovery process may be slowed. 
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Leadership does not have to be in the form of an individual governmental leader. 
Post-disaster, city, state, and federal officials are immediately, and rightly so, concerned 
with the rescue and recovery of the lives of their residents and restoring public services 
as soon as possible. Even strong leaders may not be able to handle the large-scale 
response process as well as be able to simultaneously evaluate these decisions with 
respect to long-term recovery. In these cases, or in the case of weak governmental 
leadership, other people can fill leadership voids. These people can be leaders of civic 
groups, neighborhood associations, spiritual leaders, educational leaders, or for the 
purposes of this thesis, leaders in planning, preservation, or architecture.  
In Charleston, South Carolina following Hurricane Hugo in 1989, Charles Chase, 
the city’s preservation officer, led the recovery efforts at the request of the mayor and 
managed an immediate and effective restoration for Charleston’s preservation-minded 
property owners (Nelson 1991, 43). In Chase’s own words, “The basis for Charleston’s 
recovery effort and its ability to work effectively with property owners, insurance 
adjusters, architects, and contractors grew out of a long-standing, indeed 
institutionalized, knowledge of the city’s resources” (Chase 2005, 13). Charleston had 
good historic preservation administrative integrity prior to the storm, and this integrity led 
to an effective rebuilding process. Leadership roles in historic preservation efforts 
following disasters can be filled by people other than preservationists. When 
administrative integrity for managing cultural resources is compromised after a disaster 
(or did not even exist prior to a disaster in the case of many historic districts), 
neighborhood groups and/or individuals can be preservation managers. 
Clearly a network of leadership is essential in the case of a lack of governmental 
leadership, or even to supplement effective leadership. A collaborative leadership 
network was established in New York following the 2001 attacks on the World Trade 
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Center. The Regional Plan Association of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut 
immediately established a coalition of planning and design professionals, community 
advocates, union representatives, and public officials to guide the rebuilding process 
while city’s leaders were overwhelmed with the immediate response to the disaster 
(Regional Plan Association 2005, 3). This network was quite successful in initiating quick 
post-disaster planning for a region in crisis, which is very important in a field such as 
planning that in normal circumstances takes time and adequate consideration in order to 
be accomplished successfully. Post-disaster, planning efforts need to be jump-started, 
and RPA was successful in that way. Unfortunately, in the longer-term however, the 
plans initiated by the RPA coalition have been stalled by disagreements among political 
figures and the private developer who owned the rights to develop the land. 
An example of an institution taking a leadership position after a disaster was the 
leadership of Tulane University in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina. Tulane 
officials made the decision to re-open the University in January of 2006, just four months 
after the devastation of Katrina. They made this decision while the city officials 
languished over recovery efforts and deliberated for months about how the city would 
begin the rebuilding process. Tulane University did reopen in January as planned, 
bringing back thousands of college students to an otherwise nearly deserted city. 
Unity is very important in rebuilding, and unity in decisions can be promoted by 
good leadership. In places that are vastly divided—racially, socially, economically—
rebuilding is more difficult and takes longer to achieve. In some places, the actual event 
of the disaster can unite people who were previously divided. Such was the case in NYC 
where the terrorist attacks were a uniting force for New Yorkers. In contrast, the people 
of New Orleans were quite divided prior to the flooding, and therefore it has been difficult 
to make unified decisions of how to proceed with the rebuilding efforts. 
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Amount of planning and training pre-disaster 
 There is no question that the amount of planning and training accomplished prior 
to a disaster has a great effect on how the place recovers after a disaster. Places that 
are subject to repetitive hazards such as hurricanes in general have better preparedness 
plans and training than places that are not considered to be hazard-prone. Key West, 
Florida experiences tropical storms and hurricanes on a regular basis. The town 
contains significant cultural resources such as the National Historic Landmark Ernest 
Hemingway House, National Register Truman White House, and two distinctive, historic 
residential districts. Because of Key West’s vulnerability for hurricanes, caretakers of the 
designated cultural resources are familiar with hurricane preparedness actions like 
installing hurricane shutters. Residential property owners are also familiar with ways to 
protect their homes from hurricane damage. Hurricanes are an accepted risk of living in 
the Florida Keys, and people plan and prepare for storms, reducing the damage that 
hurricanes can do. Planning in places that are hazard-prone can be accomplished by 
pre-disaster mitigation plans, or by post-disaster recovery plans that include mitigation 
for future disasters. It is quite common for municipalities that experience disasters less 
often to avoid accomplishing disaster planning or mitigation until after a disaster occurs. 
Unfortunately it only takes one disaster to devastate cultural resources; it is always 
important for places to plan. It is also important for places to include cultural resources in 
their disaster planning. 
 
Sustainability of the place 
A recent trend in disaster studies is mitigation through promoting sustainable 
ideas in development and design of populated places. This is more directly applicable to 
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places that are vulnerable to natural hazards rather than political conflicts or deliberate 
events. Certain places have natural hazards that are beyond the control of humans; 
there is obvious risk associated with settling and building in these places. Current 
disaster theory as well as theories in planning and architecture state that humans create 
vulnerabilities in the places and the methods in which we build. With advances in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries in engineering and construction, humans have tried 
to reduce vulnerabilities by employing sophisticated engineering techniques. The levees 
in New Orleans are a perfect example of huge engineering feats necessary to protect 
settlements from natural hazards. A more recent theory in designing settlements, 
however, is to design with knowledge of hazards, or designing our built environment to 
be in harmony with nature instead of overcoming it. Mileti writes in Disasters by Design 
that land-use planning which keeps people and property out of the way of natural 
disasters, maintains the mitigative qualities of natural environmental systems, and 
designs development to be resilient in the face of natural forces creates a much more 
sustainable built environment (Mileti 1999, 156). 
When places experience a disaster, they rebuild in a variety of more—or less—
sustainable ways. On one extreme are places that decide to completely relocate in order 
to eliminate the hazard. An example is the town of Valmeyer, Illinois which moved 
almost its entire town to higher ground after the Midwest floods of 1993. Some places 
choose to rebuild in the same place, but by using different materials and/or different 
design and building techniques, vulnerabilities can be reduced (mitigation). An example 
of this is the rebuilding that took place after the Chicago fire of 1881. In order to prevent 
future damage from widespread fires, streets were widened, buildings were designed 
differently, and masonry and metal construction were used more than timber. These 
different materials and methods made Chicago a much more sustainable city with 
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respect to the hazard of fire. At the other extreme are places that decide to rebuild in the 
same places with the same levels of protection, or the same building typologies and 
materials; here there is a complete absence of mitigation or sustainability. 
This trend towards sustainability in disaster management is yet another threat to 
cultural resources, as many important cultural resources were designed and built in 
times where attitudes in construction were of overcoming nature and natural disasters 
rather than designing with respect to natural landscapes and forces. Because some 
cultural resources are no longer sustainable with respect to current trends in disaster 
management, they may be targeted for demolition or relocation, losing or diminishing the 
historical significance of the resource. An example of this is the Mid-City Historic District 
in New Orleans. Many of the historic buildings were constructed after 1900, when the 
formerly swampy area was drained by a pumping system. The area still lies below sea 
level and is particularly susceptible to flooding; it sustained severe damage during the 
Hurricane Katrina floods. There are many neighborhoods that are located in 
unsustainable areas; that is, they will be always susceptible to flooding, but at the time 
they were built, assurances were made by the federal government about the protection 
of the area by levees constructed by the Army Corps of Engineers. These 
neighborhoods were built with the understanding that they would be protected in a time 
of flooding, but the levees were never built to sustain damage from a very strong 
hurricane, and additionally, these levees were not kept in good repair, and therefore 
failed when New Orleans was hit with storm surge from Hurricane Katrina. While 
preservationists may want to preserve these important vernacular neighborhoods in New 
Orleans, preservation would only be made practical by massive expenditures for 
construction and maintenance of levee systems. Many disaster professionals do not 
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consider places such as this to be sustainable, and therefore recommend returning the 
landscape to its more natural existence. 
Sustainability in post-disaster recovery is one of the most important trends in the 
disaster management field today. Taxpayers will not tolerate the huge federal 
expenditures needed in order to rebuild places multiple times. Disaster managers and 
preservationists in their own individual fields view sustainability as important, but they 
define and evaluate it differently. A key definition of “sustainability” was developed by the 
World Commission on Environment and Development in the late 1980s: “development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs” (Mileti 1999, 29). The Commission made the point 
that economics, ecology, and social equity are inseparable with respect to sustainability. 
In the 1990s as part of a national assessment on natural and technological 
hazards and disasters, prominent disaster researcher and sociologist Dennis Mileti 
defined six principles of sustainable hazards mitigation, which included the issues of 
quality of life, environmental quality, local resilience to and responsibility for disasters, 
economic vitality, equity of resources for future generations, and adopting a consensus-
building approach to disaster management, starting at the local level (Mileti 1999, 30-
35). Preservationists define sustainability as executing preservation policy and methods 
that can be sustained for the future, and protecting cultural resources for future 
generations. 
Where historic preservation and disaster management cross paths, these 
definitions must be merged. Disaster managers must redefine their definition of 
sustainability to include cultural values and cultural resources rather than relying on 
economic and ecological values. None of the principles of sustainable hazards mitigation 
in Mileti’s book directly address historic preservation, however several are related, and 
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can be better defined to include historic preservation. Quality of life is enhanced by the 
character of a place. Preservation can contribute to economic vitality; in New Orleans 
the tourism industry is largely based on the cultural resources of the historic city. Historic 
preservation is about creating resilience in our cultural resources in both daily life, and 
with respect to events like disasters. Preservation preserves cultural resources for future 
generations. 
As disaster managers should redefine sustainability to include preservation, 
preservationists should include disaster considerations in their efforts to increase the 
sustainability of cultural resources. Both professions need to work together to make 
recommendations about what to do with damaged historic buildings or landscapes post-
disaster. This collaboration will not always be easy. Returning to the example of the Mid-
City Historic District in New Orleans, while disaster managers may say that the area is 
not sustainable because of its low elevation, preservationists may say that New Orleans 
is not sustainable without its cultural resources, including those located in the Mid-City 
Historic District. This is perhaps a perfect example of where Mileti’s last principle, 
adopting a consensus-building approach to disaster management starting at the local 
level, could be applied to determine the best course of action for cultural resources in 
New Orleans. 
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Definitions 
 
The design fields of planning, preservation, and architecture may use different 
definitions of disaster terms than the field of disaster studies, so it is important to define 
what is meant by certain words. I have quoted the following definitions directly from The 
Vulnerability of Cities, a 2003 book by Dr. Mark Pelling, a leading scholar in the field of 
disaster risk and public policy (Pelling 2003, 5): 
 
Risk To be threatened by harm. To be at risk is to be under threat of 
harm 
Hazard The potential to harm individuals or human systems. In this 
work, hazard is ascribed to natural, physical, or environmental 
elements. It can be everyday (scarcity of clean drinking water) 
or episodic (volcanic eruption) 
Vulnerability Denotes exposure to risk and an inability to avoid or absorb 
potential harm 
Physical vulnerability Vulnerability in the built environment 
Social vulnerability Vulnerability experienced by people and their social, economic 
and political systems 
Human vulnerability The combination of physical and social vulnerability 
Resilience The capacity to adjust to threats and mitigate or avoid harm. 
Resilience can be found in hazard-resistant buildings or 
adaptive social systems. 
Disaster The outcome of hazard and vulnerability coinciding. Disaster is 
a state of disruption to systemic functions. Systems operate at 
a variety of scales, from individuals’ biological and 
psychological constitutions or local socio-economies to urban 
infrastructure networks and the global political economy 
 
 
The relationships among these different terms can be complicated. Many places 
that people choose to inhabit, despite their inherent advantages also have inherent 
hazards. Earthquakes are a hazard in California, hurricanes are a hazard along the Gulf 
Coast, and flooding is a hazard in low-lying areas near rivers. By settling these areas, 
humans take on a certain amount of risk. Identifying vulnerability is a key concept in 
disaster preparedness; human actions can be taken to reduce certain vulnerabilities. 
Pelling’s definition of disaster, that it is “the outcome of hazard and vulnerability 
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coinciding,” implies that by either avoiding hazards, or eliminating vulnerability, disasters 
can be avoided, or at least the damage minimized. 
 
The Disaster Cycle 
Disaster management takes place in a continuous cycle as illustrated in Fig. 1 
(Schwab et al. 1998, 19). It is divided in theory into segments based on the repetitive 
cycle of the event of a disaster followed by a period of response, followed by recovery 
and rebuilding, followed by lessons learned and preparation for future disasters, then the 
event of another disaster. The process of mitigation is continuous throughout the entire 
cycle. 
 
   Figure 1: The Disaster Cycle 
   (Schwab et al. 1998, 19) 
 
Each of these segments, or phases, is not equal in length of time or equal in 
amount of money and/or resources expended. Additionally, the roles of scientists, 
professionals, public officials, and the public, the perceived “customer” in the disaster 
preparedness and response business, are different in each phase. To further complicate 
matters, in an urban setting more than one disaster can be unfolding at a given time, 
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and/or different parts of the city could be experiencing different phases of the disaster 
cycle (Pelling 2003, 13). For example, one section of a city might be only slightly 
damaged by a flood, and move through the phases of the cycle quickly, while another 
section may be severely damaged and progress more slowly. Professionals involved in 
the process need to understand the different stages of the disaster cycle and the roles 
that they can or should play in each stage. 
The occurrence of a disaster is a benchmark in the cycle. The disaster usually 
has a defined beginning and end, and is relatively short in duration. In large-scale 
disasters that are somewhat predictable and that affect places with effective disaster 
management plans in place, by the time the disaster occurs (with at least some prior 
notice), the place may be evacuated, and only populated by public safety officials such 
as police, fire, and engineering personnel to protect municipal functions such as 
water/sewer services and provide protection/security/rescue services to the community. 
During the disaster, these personnel can play a large role in the number of lives saved 
and in the amount of damage incurred or prevented; they can prevent damage by quick-
response actions such as assessing damage and covering roofs or repairing damaged 
water pumps. 
The response phase begins during the disaster, or immediately prior to the 
disaster if possible, and continues for a relatively short period of time. This is a chaotic 
time for a municipality as services are directed towards rescue efforts, damage control, 
and quick damage assessments in order to evaluate whether the disaster recovery can 
be accomplished by the local government, or whether state and/or federal assistance is 
needed. These actions can play a crucial role in preventing damage to cultural 
resources. Obviously, the most important actions during a disaster are those that protect 
and rescue human life, but in prioritizing efforts to save property, public safety officials, if 
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trained properly, could focus efforts on areas containing important cultural resources 
first, then protect other places as resources allow. If improperly trained, or even 
untrained, these important responders could miss opportunities to protect cultural 
resources. 
The recovery phase is characterized by returning municipal services to residents 
and businesses, rebuilding, and recovering from psychological wounds. This is a 
particularly vulnerable time for cultural resources as recovery actions that may be seen 
as immediate in nature could be implemented without regard or consideration for their 
effects on cultural resources. The preparedness phase occurs after the more immediate 
tasks are accomplished. Here the response and recovery can be evaluated for strengths 
and weaknesses and recommendations made for future disaster preparedness. 
As illustrated in the Disaster Cycle diagram (Fig. 1), mitigation is a continuous 
process of evaluating the effects of many different actions with respect to a disaster, and 
taking action to reduce the potential negative effects of a future disaster. Mitigation 
includes identification of risk and vulnerabilities, then taking action to reduce these risks 
and vulnerabilities. Mitigation is perhaps the most important element of the disaster 
cycle, and is depicted as a continuous process. Important steps in mitigation occur 
immediately following a disaster as rebuilding occurs. For example, in an attempt to 
mitigate damage from a future flood, people may elevate houses as they rebuild, or 
rebuild in a completely different place. Both of these actions have serious ramifications 
with respect to historic preservation. Mitigation also occurs in the preparedness phase 
when research on a particular disaster response is evaluated in order to improve the 
response process for future disasters. The mitigation phase is also continuous at the 
national level as professionals research disasters in general, disaster response, and 
policy in order to improve the response phase. The Federal Emergency Management 
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Agency (FEMA) employs specialists in preservation who are continuously researching 
ways to protect cultural resources, and academics and professionals in the fields of 
planning, preservation, and architecture are also more recently realizing the importance 
of including disaster considerations in their fields. 
Unfortunately, in many situations mitigation is only executed in the recovery 
phase; if a place has not been exposed to a recent disaster, mitigation and 
preparedness may not be a priority. It is very important, however, to continue to 
emphasize to both public officials as well as preservation and planning professionals the 
fact that disaster mitigation is a continuous process and should occur at all times in a 
community. It is vital to rebuild communities in a safe manner so that damage is reduced 
in future disasters, but it is also essential to think about the effect that day-to-day 
decisions made by localities have in the event of a future disaster. An example in the 
planning field is that daily decisions made on development issues have effects on 
vulnerability of a place. Specifically, there have been explosions in development and 
population in coastal areas that result in high risk for experiencing hurricanes. When 
hazardous places are developed, disaster mitigation needs to occur in order to minimize 
vulnerabilities to hazards. 
In this sense, mitigation can be described as “pre-event planning”. This term was 
used by Dennis Mileti in Disasters by Design, in which he argues that the notion of pre-
disaster planning for post-event recovery is a relatively new (since approximately the late 
1980s) and powerful concept in disaster management (Mileti 1999, 233). This idea 
creates a particularly important role for preservationists, planners, and architects in not 
only the post-disaster recovery phase, but the pre-disaster preparedness phase as these 
professions are directly involved in the physical rebuilding of a place. Platt also defines 
hazard mitigation as “reducing vulnerability to natural hazards through safer design of 
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structures and communities,” which demonstrates the importance of design 
professionals (Platt 1999, 10). 
 
Past approaches to disaster policy 
The approaches to disaster preparedness and response can be simply 
categorized as either reactive (response and recovery in the disaster cycle) or proactive 
(preparedness and mitigation). In many cases disasters cannot be anticipated, and 
therefore preparation cannot be accomplished. Situations such as the NYC terrorist 
attacks are an example. Even though specific terrorist acts cannot be anticipated, 
prevention does occur in actions such as increasing security at airports and designing of 
prominent buildings to resist the forces of bombs. However, there are many natural 
disasters that are predictable because of known natural hazards, and therefore planning 
and mitigation are both quite possible as well as desirable. 
The way that localities prepare for disasters varies widely across geography and 
also across time. Different geographies require different mitigation strategies; 
earthquake preparedness is different than planning for flooding. Different periods in 
history have also treated disaster preparedness and response differently. In the ancient 
past, disaster mitigation to the extent that it existed was accomplished by either not 
settling in places that were hazardous, or by completely moving a settlement after a 
major disaster occurred. The built environment in the past was treated in some ways as 
more transient than many urban places are in modern centuries. However, there are 
also numerous examples of beloved places that were protected from disasters and also 
rebuilt after them. The idea of permanence rather than transience of a place with respect 
to disasters is described as “resilience” by Lawrence Vale and Thomas Campanella, 
who organized a colloquium at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the spring 
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of 2002 entitled “The Resilient City: Trauma, Recovery, and Remembrance.” Resilience 
was discussed with respect to disasters of all types and cities of all ages, including 
ancient cities such as Jerusalem and Tokyo and relatively modern cities such as 
Washington D.C. and Los Angeles in their 2005 book, The Resilient City. 
 In more recent centuries, technological and engineering advances have 
changed the way that humans occupy the earth, enabling settlement in areas with 
hazardous potential that may not have been possible in ancient times. In many locations 
in the modern world, especially within developed and industrialized societies, when 
settlements are destroyed by disasters, the technological and economic resources can 
be mobilized to rebuild in the same hazardous place, but with different materials or 
techniques that can reduce exposure to damage from future natural disasters. Because 
of the capabilities of such engineering and building technologies, people have settled 
more widely in hazardous areas, relying on engineering to protect the settlement from 
the natural hazards inherent in the place. 
There are many settlements such as this throughout the world; San Francisco is 
a place where people accept the high risk of earthquakes and use earthquake-resistant 
building techniques. New Orleans is another example of such a place, as many parts of 
the city exist below sea level, and are therefore vulnerable to repetitive flooding from the 
Mississippi River. In its early, eighteenth-century history, settlement was limited to the 
higher ground close to the river. In the nineteenth century, as the city grew in population 
and economic importance, levees were constructed and the Mississippi River was more 
and more controlled by engineering in order to protect the city from the repeated flooding 
that had occurred there throughout its history. Additionally, massive pumping systems 
were built, and swamps were drained and settled. 
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Such settlement patterns have precipitated changes in the way that governments 
are involved in disaster preparedness and response. In many situations, the damage 
incurred by the collision of a large natural disaster with a highly settled place has had 
great impacts on societies. Disasters in the United States, such as the Galveston flood 
of 1900, the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, and the damage from Hurricane Katrina 
in New Orleans in 2005, affected thousands of people and their property. These 
disasters were of such a magnitude that state and local governments could not 
effectively handle the response and rebuilding efforts themselves, requiring federal 
intervention. However, earlier events such as those around the turn of the twentieth 
century were handled much differently than the disaster in New Orleans in 2005. 
 
The changing role of the federal government in disaster policy 
The balance between local, state, and federal roles in disaster response has 
changed in the last century, somewhat paralleling the increasing role of the federal 
government in other programs. The second half of the twentieth century saw a dramatic 
shift in the role of the federal government in response to natural disasters. Rutherford H. 
Platt, in his 1999 book Disasters and Democracy (13), defines three eras in federal 
disaster assistance:  
• Early Period (1880s to 1940s) – Negligible or Ad Hoc Federal Assistance 
• Transitional Period (1950s to 1980s) – Limited Federal Disaster Assistance 
• Recent Period (1980s to present) – Abundant Federal Disaster Assistance  
 
The Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950 (PL 81-875) was a benchmark in federal 
disaster assistance, intended to standardize federal response to disasters. It placed 
responsibility of initiating federal involvement with the President instead of with 
Congress, which in the past had drafted legislation specific to each disaster. Platt likens 
this increase in federal disaster assistance to the increasing role of the federal 
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government in other social programs of the post-war 1940s such as Social Security, 
farm subsidies, and veterans’ benefits (Platt 1999, 9). 
 Since 1950, legislation such as the Disaster Relief Acts of 1966 (PL 89-769), 
1969 (PL 91-79), and 1974 (PL 93-288), and the Disaster Assistance Act 1970 (PL 91-
606) steadily expanded the scope of federal disaster assistance. Various disaster aid 
programs were instituted by this legislation, and were administered by many diverse 
federal agencies such as the Federal Civil Defense Administration, the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, the Small Business Administration, and the Veterans 
Administration. A presidential Executive Order in 1979 created the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), which has since consolidated federal disaster 
management functions under one roof (Schwab et al. 1998, 35). None of this legislation, 
however, directly or even indirectly, addresses the issues of historic preservation and 
disaster management. 
 
Federal disaster policy reform 
As a result of twentieth-century disaster legislation, federal expenditures for 
disaster relief increased by staggering amounts in the second half of the twentieth 
century; $5 million was expended in the year 1950, $52 million was spent in 1953, then 
approximately $119 billion was disbursed in the 15-year period between 1977 and 1993 
(Platt 1999, 23). Criticism of such enormous and growing expenditures, as well as 
accusations that Presidential Disaster Declarations have been made or withheld for 
political reasons instead of out of genuine necessity, have precipitated an enormous 
amount of review and revision of federal disaster policy in the last two decades. 
Therefore Platt’s recent era of “Abundant Federal Disaster Assistance” from the 1980s to 
the present can be further defined as “Abundant Federal Disaster Assistance and Policy 
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Reform” where federal disaster assistance has shifted from purely post-disaster aid to 
significant pre-disaster hazard analysis and mitigation programs. There are several 
changes in disaster policy and management that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s. 
The administration of President Clinton responded differently to disaster 
management and the administration of FEMA than the first Bush administration did in 
the 1980s. President Clinton appointed James Lee Witt as the director of FEMA in 1993 
and elevated the position to cabinet level (Daniels and Daniels 2000, 5 and 13). Also in 
1993, FEMA disaster assistance programs were reviewed by the National Performance 
Review. The National Performance Review report concluded that “FEMA’s basic role 
should be to serve as the federal government’s coordinator of assistance for state and 
local governments overwhelmed by disaster, and as a catalyst for development of 
comprehensive state and local emergency management systems that emphasize loss 
control and prevention” (Platt 1999, 21-2). Under Director Witt, FEMA underwent 
administrative and policy changes, and “redirected the direction of disaster focus toward 
mitigation” (Daniels and Daniels 2000, 5).  
Also in the mid-1990s, bi-partisan Congressional task forces were convened to 
examine the disaster declaration process. The Senate Task Force’s recommendations 
included the following: 
• Establish more explicit and/or stringent criteria for providing federal disaster 
assistance 
• Emphasize hazard mitigation through incentives 
• Rely more on insurance (Platt 1999, 21) 
 
Both the Congressional Task Force findings and the overhaul of FEMA led to increased 
emphasis on preparedness and mitigation in federal disaster policy. 
Disaster reform was also significantly influenced by a national assessment of 
natural hazards research from 1994 to 1999, accomplished with a National Science 
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Foundation grant and involving over 100 researchers and practitioners who published a 
series of books on specialized topics including insurance, land use, disaster 
preparedness, recovery, and response, and a national hazards risk assessment (Mileti 
1999, ix). This assessment was the second national assessment of hazards research1 
and was directed by Dennis S. Mileti of the Natural Hazards Research and Applications 
Information Center, University of Colorado at Boulder (Tierney et al 2001, v). Mileti 
addressed the issue of linking hazards and sustainability, which was determined by the 
committee to be the unifying theme for the entire assessment. In the forward to his book 
Mileti wrote: 
The single most important contribution that this second assessment has 
to offer is the recommendation for a fundamental shift in the character of 
how the nation’s citizens, communities, governments, and businesses 
conduct themselves in relation to the natural environments they occupy. 
This book calls for and speaks to the specifics required to shift the 
national culture in ways that would stop at its genesis the ever-increasing 
spiral of losses from natural and technological hazards and disasters. The 
task will be to create and install “sustainable hazards mitigation” in the 
culture of the nation. (Mileti 1999, viii) 
 
This passage summarizes the attitudes present in the 1990s in the reforms of federal 
disaster management programs. The trend toward sustainability was also emerging in 
the fields of planning and preservation during the 1990s, and therefore, indirectly, 
disaster management and preservation overlapped as professionals were searching for 
ways to make the built environment more sustainable for the future. 
 Also during this time period two large-scale disasters affected culturally-rich 
places in the United States—Hurricane Hugo devastated Charleston, South Carolina in 
1989, and the Loma Prieta earthquake damaged areas of northern California one month 
                                                 
1 The first assessment was completed in 1975. The results were published in a summary volume 
by geographer Gilbert F. White and sociologist J Eugene Haas entitled Assessment of Research 
on Natural Hazards (Oxford University Press, 1975). 
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later. These disasters precipitated preservation conferences and publication on the topic 
of disasters with respect to historic preservation, a topic that had not before been widely 
studied in the United States. 
 
Current federal disaster policy 
All of this emphasis on disaster management study and reform resulted in the 
current complex web of legislation and policies under which disasters are managed by 
federal, state, and local governments. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 (PL 93-288) established cost-sharing requirements 
between federal, state, and local governments in disaster response, and very importantly 
provided grants for hazard mitigation efforts and planning. The Stafford Act was 
amended by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (PL 106-390), with the express intention 
“to establish a national disaster hazard mitigation program.” Its main goals are to 
streamline procedures, reduce costs, and most importantly to give high priority to 
“mitigation of hazards at the local level.” Section 101(a) of the Disaster Mitigation Act 
states: 
Congress finds that: 
(3)  expenditures for postdisaster assistance are increasing 
without commensurate reductions in the likelihood of future losses 
from natural disasters; … 
(5)  with a unified effort of economic incentives, awareness and 
education, technical assistance, and demonstrated Federal 
support, States and local governments (including Indian tribes) will 
be able to— 
 (A)  form effective community-based partnerships for 
hazard mitigation purposes; 
 (B) implement effective hazard mitigation measures that 
reduce the potential damage from natural disasters; 
 (C)  ensure continued functionality of critical services; 
 (D)  leverage additional non-Federal resources in meeting 
natural disaster resistance goals; and 
 (E) make commitments to long-term hazard mitigation 
efforts to be applied to new and existing structures. 
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This increased emphasis on mitigation is also evident in the National Flood 
Insurance Reform Act of 1994, the intent of which was to encourage cities and states to 
implement flood-plain planning in their mitigation efforts. Flood insurance is only 
available in the United States through this federally-subsidized insurance program, and it 
is criticized by some as subsidizing bad development practices by enabling development 
in flood-prone areas (Schwab et al. 1998, 35). 
Another often-expressed criticism of federal disaster legislation is that it is difficult 
for local governments, businesses, and residents to navigate the tangled web of federal 
programs and bureaucracy without assistance. Mileti emphasizes this problem: 
Most government efforts to cope with hazards today are fragmented 
horizontally at each level of government, vertically between levels of 
government, and across different types of hazards. This dispersal makes 
it extremely difficult for local governments to deal with hazards in a 
coherent way. (Mileti 1999, 279) 
 
These conclusions demonstrate a recent and growing trend in disaster policy that 
the role of the federal government is shifting from doling out post-disaster subsidies to 
1), providing support for state and local governments to implement their own programs, 
and 2), developing regional prototype models of effective and sustainable disaster 
mitigation. Perhaps the next era in Platt’s continuum of federal disaster assistance will 
therefore be the era of the federal government enabling state and local governments to 
implement their own disaster management programs. Again, these policies do not 
directly address historic preservation and planning, but overlap in indirect ways as 
planners and preservationists are also concerned with sustainability in the built 
environment. 
It should be noted that two important events in federal disaster policy and 
organization have happened in the last five years. The first change occurred in 2002 with 
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the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security; FEMA currently operates 
under the Secretary of Homeland Security rather than being the stand-alone agency it 
had been since its inception in 1979. Additional changes have occurred since the 2005 
hurricane season, in which the federal government and FEMA directly were criticized for 
lack of adequate response. Since this time, FEMA has experienced many personnel 
changes, including its director, and has been under increased public and media scrutiny. 
It is expected that when analysis of the response from the hurricane season of 2005 is 
complete, FEMA, and the entire federal disaster response structure will experience yet 
more administrative and policy changes. 
 
Federal historic preservation policy and disasters 
 Concurrent with the increasing role of the federal government in disaster policy, 
the federal government has also had an increasing role in historic preservation in the 
second half of the twentieth century. However, the role of historic preservation in 
disaster management as established in federal policy and law is indirect rather than 
being inherently stated in disaster policy. There are several ways that this indirect 
relationship is established. The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended 
(NHPA) is a landmark piece of preservation legislation that outlines several tools having 
an effect on the way that places treat buildings after (and before) a disaster. 
 The most powerful tool for preservation in disaster management is Section 106 of 
the NHPA. Section 106 establishes a requirement for “federal agencies to take into 
account the effects of their undertakings on properties included, or eligible for inclusion, 
in the National Register of Historic Places” (Preamble to Regulations Amendments, 36 
CFR Part 800, Aug. 5, 2004, p. 3). This essentially means that any projects that are 
undertaken by federal agencies, or funded even in part by federal money, have to 
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consider the effects of the project on cultural resources. This requirement for 
consideration is paralleled in the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969, as 
amended (NEPA) which requires the federal government to consider its actions with 
respect to the nation’s natural environment. The combination of the steadily increasing 
federal assistance for disaster recovery and mitigation and the requirements of Section 
106 of the NHPA as well as the requirements of the NEPA form an extremely powerful 
mandate for federal agencies to consider historic preservation as they perform both 
disaster mitigation and recovery. All disaster relief projects either funded by the federal 
government or requiring federal licenses or permits that involve buildings or sites that 
are listed on or eligible for the National Register must go through the Section 106 review 
process.  
 The NHPA also established the National Register of Historic Places which 
introduced formal criteria for evaluating buildings and created a formal list of historic 
buildings, structures, landscapes, sculpture, and districts. Seen through the eyes of a 
disaster manager, the National Register can be utilized during or after a disaster as a 
pre-disaster assessment or prioritization of buildings. This enables quicker post-disaster 
decisions about applying limited recovery resources to places that were deemed to be 
culturally significant before a disaster. Many states and municipalities established their 
own state or local registers for historic resources, as enabled by the NHPA, and these 
state and local registers can also be useful in disaster preparedness and response 
efforts.  
 This Section 106 review process for resources listed on or eligible for the 
National Register is managed by the State Historic Preservation Offices (SHPO), which 
were also established as part of the NHPA. These agencies play an extremely important 
role in disaster recovery; they have the responsibility of managing the cultural resources 
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that are listed on the National Register and any state register, including 
recommendations for designation and Section 106 review. The SHPO and its staff are in 
many cases the administrative integrity that exists for National Register sites, and are 
essential members of any post-disaster assessment. Because of the enormous amount 
of Section 106 reviews that are required after large-scale natural disasters, however, the 
chronically under funded and overworked SHPO staff can be easily overwhelmed. 
 The limitation of using the National Register as a tool for evaluating cultural 
significance is that sites are often designated years, or even decades, prior to the event 
of a disaster, and there is no requirement in the NHPA for these sites to be re-evaluated 
for significance. Several of the historic districts in New Orleans were designated in the 
1960s and have not been re-evaluated since. Therefore, the resources in the districts 
may very well have changed drastically in the 40 years between designation and 
Hurricane Katrina; the National Register listing alone should not be used to evaluate 
significance and determine priorities for resources in recovery. The same limitation 
applies to buildings or sites that are individually listed on the National Register rather 
than being a component of an historic district. An exception is that sites listed as 
National Historic Landmarks are reviewed on a regular basis, so designation as an NHL 
does indicate significance and integrity, and these cultural resources should be 
prioritized during the recovery phase. Another limitation of the historic registers when 
evaluating significance pre- or post-disaster is that existing registers do not necessarily 
comprehensively address all historic resources in a geographic area. There may be 
many other sites or districts not actually listed on any historic register, but deserving of 
listing.  
 The NHPA also established the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation 
(ACHP), with the goal of ensuring that Federal agencies act as responsible stewards of 
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our Nation’s resources when their actions affect historic properties. With respect to 
natural disasters, the ACHP is the federal agency that has the overall responsibility of 
ensuring that historic preservation is considered during the disaster recovery and also 
the disaster mitigation process. The ACHP has the final word on the treatment of 
properties that are on or eligible for the National Register, and they are in some ways the 
enforcement arm of the NHPA. The ACHP is one of the many federal agencies that work 
together laterally following a disaster to assist in recovery and rebuilding efforts and 
ensure that federal policy is maintained. The ACHP also works with state historic 
preservation offices and local preservation agencies to affect preservation, which is 
especially important when state and local agencies are overwhelmed. 
 Lastly, the NHPA delegates certain authorities to local governments. It 
established the “Certified Local Government” program which allows municipalities to 
receive federal grants and establish partnerships with SHPOs, which can be extremely 
valuable during disaster planning and recovery. Relationships between federal, state, 
and local agencies in the disaster management process are extremely important and are 
discussed in the following two chapters. 
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Federal agencies and disasters 
 
 Different disasters necessitate different responses from local, state, and federal 
governments. Disasters can be declared at the state or federal level, and each level 
authorizes response from certain agencies. In many cases, these different levels of 
government must work closely together in order to affect recovery. This chapter 
examines the different federal and state agencies that are involved in the disaster 
management process and their relationships with each other. 
 The structure of federal response to disasters is delineated in the Stafford Act, as 
amended by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, and by a document called the National 
Response Plan (NRP), which was revised under the Department of Homeland Security 
in 2004. In order to initiate the federal disaster aid mandated in the Stafford Act, the 
President must issue a Presidential Disaster Declaration. Once the declaration is issued, 
states have access to federal assistance through FEMA. Assistance is then disbursed to 
the communities through many different agencies and in many different forms; as many 
as 26 other federal agencies can be involved in the implementation of the NRP (Schwab 
et al. 1998, 23).  
 In theory, presidential disaster declarations are issued only in situations where 
the disaster is of such a magnitude that the state and local governments cannot handle 
the response themselves. In most disasters, the response and recovery is executed by 
the states without a Stafford Act Presidential declaration; only about one percent of all 
natural disasters per year result in Presidential disaster declarations (Schwab et al. 
1998, 37). In cases where a Presidential disaster declaration is not issued, states can 
still access federal aid through certain agencies, such as the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD), that have specific assistance programs in place that are 
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applied to disaster situations. One example is HUD’s Community Development Block 
Grants (CDBG). Here, the overlap with historic preservation is that Section 106 review 
applies when CDBGs are used to redevelop resources listed on or eligible for the 
National Register. In fact, Section 106 applies to ALL federal disaster assistance 
programs, not just those administered by FEMA, and which require a Presidential 
declaration. 
 Additionally, states have access to federal disaster planning and mitigation 
programs at any time, not just after a disaster occurs. Obviously, Section 106 review 
applies to federal programs for pre-disaster preparedness and mitigation, as well as any 
federal government assistance in support of a disaster recovery, regardless of whether a 
Presidential Disaster Declaration is issued or not. Therefore FEMA works closely with 
state and local governments to accomplish training. 
 As stated in the previous chapter, federal programs are increasingly focused on 
disaster preparation and mitigation in an attempt to reduce the amount of aid required in 
the responses and recovery phases of a major disaster. Therefore an increasing trend in 
preservation is for Section 106 review of mitigation plans for areas containing districts 
and/or sites on or eligible for the National Register. 
 
 
FEMA and Disaster Management of Cultural Resources 
 
 FEMA is the most important federal agency involved with disaster preparedness 
and response. The FEMA brochure entitled “This is FEMA” lists the goals of the agency 
as: 
• Coordinating federal response to presidentially declared disasters 
• Helping residents and businesses recover 
• Helping emergency managers and the public prepare for disasters 
• Working to reduce future disaster risk 
• Administering the National Flood Insurance Program and reducing flood risk 
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• Reducing losses due to fire and related emergencies (FEMA 2003) 
 
 Analyzing these goals illustrates two points about FEMA. First, FEMA’s goals 
parallel the emerging national trend to focus more and more on mitigation rather than 
response; only the first two of the six goals address the response/recovery phase of 
disaster management, and the other four are more directly associated with 
preparedness and mitigation. And secondly, each of the six goals requires extensive 
coordination among federal, state, and local governments. 
 These goals overlap with federal historic preservation goals in several ways. In 
order to meet them, FEMA has established its “Environmental and Historic Preservation 
Program, which “assist[s] FEMA staff and non-federal partners to anticipate and 
accomplish environmental and historic preservation review required by federal laws and 
executive orders” (FEMA Environmental and Historic Preservation Programs). FEMA’s 
environmental and historic specialists execute Section 106 review for FEMA-funded 
mitigation or recovery projects. These projects include working with individual 
homeowners whose homes are listed or eligible for the National Register and also 
working with public agencies, non-profits, or educational administers to ensure 
compliance with Section 106 during the rebuilding process. FEMA’s recovery efforts are 
highly focused on individual buildings and do not directly address the preservation or 
rebuilding of historic districts, landscapes, or cultural landscapes. These cultural 
resources are less likely to have an individual or organization responsible for 
maintenance and decision-making, or administrative integrity. It is certainly a weakness 
in federal policy that recovery assistance, as well as mitigation assistance is 
administered primarily on a building to building level, and not at the more broad level of 
districts or landscapes. The FEMA Environmental and Historic Preservation staff 
members do also assist communities in mitigation design projects. They aim to retain the 
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elements of the community’s physical and built environment while making it more 
resistant to natural hazards. In preparedness and mitigation efforts, FEMA still focuses 
primarily on individual buildings, but does address preserving character and 
relationships among individual buildings and landscape elements. 
 Another very important role of FEMA is to provide resources for state and local 
governments. As stated above, most disaster events in the United States are handled at 
the state and local levels; therefore it is essential for state and local agencies to be 
trained in disaster preparation/mitigation and response. While much of this support and 
training is focused on social issues and emergency response, FEMA’s ten regional 
offices also work closely with state and local governments to accommodate historic 
preservation.  
 One such mitigation effort is the series of “How-to Guides,” published by FEMA in 
the early 2000s. These “How-to Guides” are aimed at educating local governments and 
individuals on disaster preparedness and response. A specific guide for the treatment of 
historic property, called “Integrating Historic Property and Cultural Resource 
Considerations Into Hazard Mitigation Planning” was published in May of 2005. This 
publication is extremely detailed; it is over 200 pages, and guides local governments, 
community interest groups, and/or cultural organizations of all sizes and economic 
means through developing a hazard mitigation plan for their cultural resources. This 
process has four phases: 1) organize resources, 2) assess risks, 3) develop a mitigation 
plan, and 4) implement the plan and monitor progress (FEMA 2005, Forward). 
 In these four steps, local governments learn how to determine which cultural 
resources are likely to be damaged in a disaster and prioritize the ones that are most 
important. The guide recommends gathering inventories of cultural resources from 
various sources including the National Register, planning organizations, and the public, 
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then overlaying maps of these cultural resources onto maps of hazard areas. This can 
be done either by simply hand-drawing or by using Geographic Information System 
(GIS) software. Once historic properties are prioritized for mitigation efforts, potential 
mitigation actions can be analyzed through benefit-cost analysis. Finally, a mitigation 
plan can be developed. 
 A specific application of this process was accomplished in 2002, when FEMA 
Region III1 completed a demonstration project to better integrate historic preservation 
goals into the hazard mitigation process. The results were published in a report entitled 
“Looking to the Future: alternatives for reducing flood-related damage in historic 
communities.” This repors is illustrative of one of FEMA’s important goals of working with 
state and local governments to reduce losses in areas that are prone to repetitive 
disasters such as hurricanes or, in the case of this study, flooding. (United Research 
Services 2002, PS-1). 
 The community of Milton, Pennsylvania was chosen as the demonstration 
location; it is a small town in central Pennsylvania in the floodplain of the Susquehanna 
River that contains an historic district. Milton has experienced repetitive flooding since it 
was settled in 1792. The website for the project states the goals of the study: 
 
This study was an important step in collaboration among FEMA Region III 
staff, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, the Bureau of 
Historic Preservation of the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum 
Commission and the Borough of Milton to determine what mitigative 
actions could be taken to allow FEMA to meet its strategic goal of 
reducing the loss of lives and property while minimizing any adverse 
effects to historic properties. 
 
 This study illustrates the interdisciplinary, extremely collaborative efforts required 
in the mitigation of cultural resources in a community. This particular project was the 
                                                 
1 FEMA Region III covers Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia. 
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result of collaboration among federal, state, and local governmental agencies, as well as 
local interest groups and the public, and was accomplished by the URS Corporation, a 
large, national engineering and architecture firm with offices that specialize in cultural 
resource management.  
 
Additional goals are listed in the report as: 
• Provide recommendations for streamlining regulatory procedures for federal 
undertakings affecting historic properties; 
• Suggest options for future integration of historic preservation and hazard 
mitigation land-use planning efforts; and 
• Create a template for use by other historic communities in Pennsylvania 
(United Research Services 2002, PS-1) 
 
 The cultural resource specialists from URS accomplished the study in six months 
by moving through the phases outlined by FEMA and listed above for developing a 
hazard mitigation plan. Overall, the study is thorough, and analyzes several options for 
minimizing future damage from flooding such as acquisition and demolition, elevation, 
relocation, wet and dry floodproofing, and structural flood diversion improvements and 
stream channel modifications. It applies these options to the cultural resources in Milton 
and makes recommendations on treatments for different types of cultural resources 
(URS 2002, 4-1 to 4-9). 
 Overall, the study is a good application of the principles of hazard mitigation for 
cultural resources, and accomplishes its goal of serving as a model for other 
communities to follow. Unfortunately, the process of creating a mitigation plan for cultural 
resources is quite time-consuming, and requires professional services that may not be 
available to smaller communities or those with limited budgets. Therefore, rather than 
accomplishing a dedicated preservation mitigation plan as its own goal, preservation 
mitigation planning could be accomplished in a more piecemeal way by simultaneously 
considering disaster mitigation when other preservation efforts are accomplished, or 
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considering preservation when general disaster mitigation is accomplished. An example 
is to consider disaster mitigation during preservation campaigns on buildings, and 
implement techniques such as floodproofing while other repairs or maintenance are also 
being done. Another example is for disaster managers who are not trained in 
preservation to reference the FEMA demonstration study to assist in addressing 
mitigation for cultural resources when mitigation plans are done for a community. 
 Both the FEMA guide and the URS study are detailed and informative resources 
for mitigation of cultural resources. However they are much more focused on buildings 
as cultural resources, and not as much on districts, landscapes, or cultural landscapes. 
As discussed in a previous chapter, it is easier to assess the monetary value of buildings 
than landscapes. Because this method of mitigation planning uses benefit-cost analysis 
to prioritize assets for mitigation efforts, the monetary value of landscapes is not 
evaluated, nor is the monetary value of ensembles of historic resources such as districts 
as a whole. Landscapes and other cultural resources are addressed, however, by 
including in the mitigation strategies such considerations as using demolition or 
relocation with extreme care in historic districts (even for demolition of only select 
buildings) to avoid losing character-defining features of the district such as density, 
landscaping, orientation, and setback (FEMA 2005, 3-17).  
 Another suggestion in the FEMA guide is that when elevating buildings above 
certain flood levels, the surrounding landscape should be properly graded to maintain 
more of the character and scale of the property. Another landscape/cultural landscape 
consideration that is discussed in the study is the relationship of the community with the 
waterfront. Some mitigation actions like constructing levees or floodwalls could 
drastically change this relationship. Landscape protection from natural hazards is briefly 
discussed in the study by suggesting options such as sediment and erosion control, 
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stream corridor restoration, watershed management, and wetland restoration and 
preservation. Some landscapes could have monetary value if they are used as 
recreational or tourism areas (FEMA 2005, 3-22). Certainly all of these considerations 
are valid, and even though a monetary value cannot be assigned to some character-
defining features, they should most definitely be taken into account when analyzing 
mitigation options. 
 
 
The National Flood Insurance Program and Preservation 
 
 Another program administered by FEMA is the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP). The 1968 National Flood Insurance Act (NFIA) (PL 90-448, Title XIII) 
provided subsidized federal flood insurance for flood-plain property owners “in the 
absence of affordable flood insurance from the private insurance industry” (Platt 1999, 
30). Post-disaster, in order for property owners to receive federal grants or loans for 
repair, they are required to obtain federal flood insurance. Because this insurance 
program is administered by the federal government, the NHPA requires that historic 
preservation considerations be taken into account. The NFIA is a complicated piece of 
legislation that requires property owners and municipalities to adhere to certain 
standards of flood mitigation in order to receive flood insurance, and also rates 
communities that exceed the NFIP minimums through the Community Rating System 
(CRS). The lower the CRS rating (and therefore the better the community’s mitigation 
level), the greater the reduction that property owners receive in their flood insurance 
rates. The NFIP also requires that communities develop a floodplain ordinance that “sets 
standards for construction and rehabilitation of structures located in flood-prone areas” 
(URS 2002, 1-5). 
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 The very nature of flood mitigation and buildings, however, means that changes 
must be made to historic buildings in order to qualify them for flood insurance. Some 
changes, such as raising the buildings to the minimum elevation required by the NFIP, 
drastically change the historic character of buildings. To encourage property owners of 
historic structures to maintain historic character, the NFIP waives certain requirements. 
Communities have the option, through their local floodplain ordinances, to use two 
different options for historic structures. First, variances may be granted for the “repair or 
rehabilitation of historic structures upon a determination that the proposed repair or 
rehabilitation will not preclude the structure’s continued designation as a historic 
structure and the variance is the minimum necessary to preserve the historic character 
and design of the structure” (44 CFR 60.6 (a) (1)). Second, “alteration to an historic 
structure does not constitute a substantial improvement, provided that the alteration will 
not preclude the structure’s continued designation as an historic structure” (44 CFR 
59.1). 
 
FEMA and SHPOs 
 
 FEMA and the State Historic Preservation Offices have been working much more 
closely in the last decade in order to incorporate preservation in the disaster 
management efforts of FEMA. In the 1990s a nationwide model Programmatic 
Agreement was reached between the National Conference of State Historic Preservation 
Officers and FEMA. This agreement balances the streamlined FEMA post-disaster 
assessment process by requiring preservation to be factored into disaster recovery 
efforts (URS 2002, 1-5). These programmatic agreements delineate responsibilities of 
FEMA and the SHPO in post-disaster Section 106 review. They also outline specific 
short cuts with respect to Section 106 review such as excluding from SHPO and ACHP 
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review routine activities such as plumbing and electrical modifications, abbreviating the 
time frames for SHPO review, and providing standard treatment measures for adverse 
effects (Spennemann and Look 1998, 10) These agreements facilitate FEMA’s quicker 
delivery of assistance while ensuring that preservation goals are still met. 
 Such a programmatic agreement was reached in 1994 following the Northridge 
Earthquake among FEMA, the California Office of Emergency Services, the Advisory 
Council on Historic Preservation, and the SHPO. One innovation in this agreement was 
the delegation of normal federal responsibilities of assessment of APEs, DOEs for listing 
in the National Register, and Section 106 review to a private contracting firm, working 
under the SHPO, and paid by FEMA. The contractor assumed these responsibilities, and 
the agreement worked very well in streamlining the process (Spennemann and Look 
1998, 14). 
 
The Federal Historic Preservation Tax Incentive Program 
 
 Another historic preservation tool that is useful after disasters is the Federal 
Historic Preservation Tax Incentive Program (TIP), which was established as a part of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. This program allows a 20% tax credit for the 
“certified rehabilitation of certified historic structures” (National Park Service 2006). This 
credit is offered for buildings listed on the National Register, or eligible for the National 
Register, and the rehabilitation has to be accomplished following the Secretary of the 
Interior’s Standards for the Rehabilitation of Historic Buildings. However, the credit only 
applies to commercial buildings, not residences. In post-disaster rebuilding where it may 
be necessary to repair substantial damage to historic resources, the TIP is a valuable 
tool in preservation of historic commercial buildings that may otherwise have been 
demolished post-disaster. 
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Special legislation for specific disasters 
 
 In specific disaster situations, Congress may pass special legislation that 
provides additional aid to disaster-stricken areas. On December 21, 2005, the President 
signed the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 (HR 4440). This act, among many other 
aid programs, provided for a Federal Tax Incentive of 26% for buildings damaged by 
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. Even though the incentive can only be applied to 
commercial buildings, the increase in the tax credit from 20% to 26% is a valuable tool in 
preservation post-disaster. The GOZA also increased the Rehabilitation Tax Credit for 
non-historic structures from 10% to 13% (Faussett). There was a proposal in Congress 
to also extend the tax credit to residential property damaged in Hurricane Katrina, but 
unfortunately this was never realized. Such a credit would be an incentive to 
homeowners to restore, rather than demolish and rebuild, their historic buildings after 
disasters. 
 Additionally for Hurricane Katrina, a Programmatic Agreement (PA) was reached 
among FEMA, the Mississippi State Historic Preservation Office, and the Mississippi 
Emergency Management Agency. This agreement allowed FEMA to assume many 
responsibilities for Section 106 review normally done by the SHPO, then provide the 
SHPO fourteen days for review. This PA closely followed the PA agreed upon by FEMA 
and the National Conference of State Historic Preservation Officers, and is similar to an 
agreement for the state of Louisiana post-Katrina. 
 
 
National Non-governmental Organizations and disasters 
 
 It is apparent that disaster legislation is complicated and all phases of the 
disaster cycle (response, recovery, preparation, and mitigation) require immense 
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cooperation among federal, state, and local governments as well as advocacy groups 
such as the National Trust for Historic Preservation, the Center for Preservation 
Technology and Training, and the American Planning Association.  A large amount of 
disaster aid is also provided by these non-governmental organizations, whether it be in 
the form of financial, volunteer, advocacy, or professional assistance. Following 
Hurricane Katrina the American Institute of Architects collaborated with the American 
Planning Association at the request of Louisiana Gov. Kathleen Blanco and the 
Louisiana Recovery Authority to organize the three-day “Louisiana Recovery and 
Rebuilding Conference” which was held in New Orleans from November 10-12, 2005. 
The conference was co-sponsored by the National Trust for Historic Preservation and 
the American Society of Civil Engineers. It brought together 650 citizens, community 
leaders, architects, planners, engineers, business people, and public officials who 
formed planning principles and redevelopment goals, as well as outlining six themes for 
the recovery process: Unify, Cooperate, Protect (using levee protection and coastal 
restoration), Preserve (historic resources), Rebuild, and Improve.  
 As well as organizing conferences, these different non-profit organizations 
mobilized volunteers, raised funds, and used their websites and publications to create 
national awareness of and dialog on the problems faced following Hurricane Katrina. 
The American Planning Association sent a team of experts to New Orleans to assess 
the city’s post-Katrina ability to execute planning efforts; this team published a review of 
its findings in November 2005. Also in November of 2005 the Urban Land Institute 
presented detailed rebuilding recommendations to Mayor Nagin’s “Bring New Orleans 
Back Committee.” Specific to historic preservation, the Center for Preservation 
Technology and Training established an exhaustive and comprehensive clearinghouse 
of information on their website to assist property owners in cleaning and restoring 
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historic buildings after flood damage. These are just a few examples of the extremely 
important role of national advocacy organizations following disasters. These 
organizations since the widespread devastation of Hurricane Katrina are also raising 
awareness among their various professional members on the need for disaster planning 
and mitigation in places all over the country, not just New Orleans. 
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LOCAL INITIATIVES 
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 There are many local public and private agencies that are involved in disaster 
management and cultural resource management, and these local entities vary widely 
from municipality to municipality. Some cities have large departments that handle 
disaster planning and management as well as city planning and historic preservation. 
Other smaller cities or towns may have neither dedicated disaster managers nor 
dedicated preservation or planning specialists. This chapter discusses the structure of 
the local agencies in New Orleans with respect to disaster management, planning, and 
historic preservation in order to demonstrate relationships between local agencies and 
state and federal agencies in disaster preparation and recovery. 
 
New Orleans and local preservation agencies 
 New Orleans has numerous strengths with respect to local agencies as well as 
several weaknesses. The city of New Orleans has a long and distinguished preservation 
history; it had established preservation organizations and efforts much earlier in its 
history compared with many other American cities. Several small preservation 
organizations formed in the 1920s to restore individual buildings in the French Quarter. 
The Vieux Carré Commission (VCC), the second oldest historic district in the country, 
was formerly created by amendment to the Louisiana Constitution in 1936, and in 1937 
the New Orleans Commission Council passed an ordinance that charged the 
Commission with the “preservation and regulation of all private property with historic or 
architectural value within the confines of the designated district” (Vieux Carré 
Commission). The 1995 Code of the City of New Orleans defined the composition, 
purpose, and area of jurisdiction of the Commission. These early preservation efforts 
were instrumental in the revitalization of the badly deteriorated French Quarter, and they 
led to the Quarter’s later emergence as a tourist destination. 
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 Another example of the strong preservation presence in New Orleans is the 
successful opposition to the proposal for an interstate highway along the Mississippi 
River that would have cut directly through the French Quarter in the 1960s. Because of 
the efforts of local preservationists, and eventually the advice of the newly-formed 
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, the plan was abandoned and the French 
Quarter saved from destruction. Many other American cities did build expressways 
through their older neighborhoods during this time period, permanently removing historic 
fabric and resources. 
 The city of New Orleans has maintained strong preservation organization in both 
the city government and the private, non-profit realms both because of its early 
emphasis on preservation, and also because tourism has become a major portion of the 
city’s economy, which relies heavily on the history and historic fabric of New Orleans. 
The city has three different historical commissions: the Vieux Carré Commission (VCC), 
which has jurisdiction over the French Quarter; the New Orleans Historic District 
Landmarks Commission (HDLC), with jurisdiction over the eight residential local historic 
districts; and the Central Business District Historic District Landmarks Commission (CBD 
HDLC), with jurisdiction over the four downtown local historic districts. These latter two 
landmark commissions share the same staff, and were enabled by two similar New 
Orleans Ordinances. 
 The HDLC was created by City of New Orleans Ordinance Number 5992 M.C.S., 
which was passed in 1976 and revised in 1980. It enables the City Council to designate 
historic districts, and the HDLC to designate individual buildings or sites as “Landmarks” 
or “Landmark Sites.” The enabling legislation for the CBD HDLC is Ordinance Number 
6699 which was passed in 1978 and revised in 1981. It mirrors the HDLC Ordinance, but 
adds criteria for “Ratings of Significance” for buildings ranging from Category A: 
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Buildings of National Importance, to Category F: Unrated Buildings, or “buildings that are 
generally twentieth century structures that have no real architectural value” (City of New 
Orleans Ordinance Number 6699, 1981). These three commissions are empowered to 
review proposals for all alterations to the exteriors of buildings or building demolition in 
the local historic districts as well as serve citations for “Demolition by Neglect” for 
buildings that are not maintained. 
 The City of New Orleans is also designated a Certified Local Government (CLG) 
by the National Park Service. The 1980 amendment to the NHPA established the 
“Certified Local Government” as a tool to delegate some of the responsibilities of the 
SHPO to certain local governments that meet fairly rigorous standards for local 
preservation administration. These include establishing a historic preservation 
commission, enforcing appropriate legislation for designating and protecting historic 
properties, maintaining systems for identifying historic properties and including public 
participation in the local historic preservation program (National Park Service 2004, 16). 
With respect to disasters, in the planning and recovery process, these Certified Local 
Governments can be extremely useful in assessing damage to historic properties and 
making decisions on priorities for rebuilding because they have already established the 
framework for administrative integrity in historic preservation. Another strong 
preservation asset in the city of New Orleans is the Preservation Resource Center 
(PRC), a non-profit advocacy and education organization that was founded in 1974. The 
PRC has a staff of 19 and an annual budget of $1.4 million (PRC). In New Orleans 
immediately after Hurricane Katrina, the PRC served as a clearinghouse for information 
on cleaning and rebuilding historic properties after flooding, providing an invaluable 
service to property owners, and filling in gaps in the administrative integrity of the city’s 
preservation commissions. 
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 Since the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans has obviously had 
many preservation challenges. One of the biggest problems after a disaster in any 
locality is the problem of fractured administrative integrity. In the best cases of good 
administrative integrity, municipalities have strong preservation ordinances with strong 
preservation commissions; New Orleans is an example of such a place. They also have 
close working relationships with the State Historic Preservation Office and ties to local 
and/or national non-profits that perform advocacy functions. After a disaster, the local 
and state preservation organizations are stretched to, and often pushed past, their limits. 
Every disaster is different and each requires organizations to perform either different 
functions, or to perform “normal” functions such as the SHPO performing Section 106 
review in massive quantities and within limited time schedules. 
 Another problem with local organizations after a disaster is that their offices and 
records may have been damaged, so personnel are required to work out of temporary 
facilities without access to their normal administrative working environment. In the case 
of New Orleans, this problem was extreme; the staff of local agencies fled either before 
or during the flooding, and were not able to return to the city for days or even months. 
The New Orleans city government was forced to lay off a large percentage of its 
personnel after the storm because its tax revenue was so greatly reduced in just a 
matter of days. For preservationists, this meant that the staff of the three Historic 
Commissions was decimated by lay-offs and relocation, and the remaining staff was 
suffering from personal trauma on top of insurmountable work loads. The administrative 
integrity of preservation efforts in New Orleans was shattered after Hurricane Katrina, at 
the same time that its innumerable historic resources needed the help of the Historic 
Commissions and the Preservation Resource Center. 
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 In disasters such as this, the SHPOs can, and should, work closely with the local 
organizations, whether or not this relationship was a strong one before the disaster. In 
Louisiana, however, the damage from Hurricane Katrina was not limited to New Orleans, 
but also severely damaged many other municipalities. In short, the SHPO was just as 
overwhelmed as the local preservation organizations. These shortcomings were 
recognized immediately after the disaster by preservation staff, as well as the FEMA 
environmental and historic preservation staff. A Programmatic Agreement was signed 
shortly after Hurricane Katrina among FEMA, the Louisiana SHPO, and the Louisiana 
Emergency Management Agency in order to streamline procedures for assessment of 
damaged cultural resources. Volunteers flooded in from all over the country, organized 
by the National Trust for Historic Preservation, the Association for Preservation 
Technology, and numerous other preservation-related organizations. Additionally, these 
organizations donated money, performed fundraising, and advocated for money from the 
federal government for preservation purposes. The widespread damage from Hurricane 
Katrina, and the widespread media coverage, precipitated an influx of aid from all over 
the world for the city of New Orleans, and shed a stark light on the vulnerability of the 
procedures, policies and people on which preservation administration relies. 
 
New Orleans and factors that affect disaster recovery 
 The situation in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina can be compared to 
numerous historic disasters in order to analyze its strengths and weaknesses in the 
recovery process. Chapter 2 of this thesis discussed factors that affect disaster recovery, 
and New Orleans can be analyzed with respect to these five factors: type of disaster and 
scale of destruction, nature of place affected, leadership, planning and training pre-
disaster, and sustainability. 
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 The type of disaster in New Orleans—flooding that was sustained for weeks—is 
a dangerous type of disaster for vernacular historic resources. Flooding such as this 
causes wood to swell, which is irreparable in many cases. It also causes mold to grow 
on interior surfaces such as plaster and trim, which must then be completely removed. 
Additionally, the geography of New Orleans, with much of the city built below sea level, 
meant that the flooding and therefore damage was extremely widespread. Entire historic 
districts were damaged, and the landscape of the whole city was permanently changed. 
 Leadership was also a problem after Hurricane Katrina. The municipal leadership 
of New Orleans was shattered. Mayor Ray Nagin had been a relatively weak leader prior 
to the disaster, and following Katrina he did not take a strong stand in making large-
scale decisions about the repopulation and re-planning of the city. The decisions to be 
made in New Orleans post-Katrina were very difficult ones, and also would be unpopular 
if they meant that only parts of the city would be rebuilt. The mayor was running for re-
election in May of 2006, and he was unwilling to make decisions that would be 
unpopular to some of his voting constituency following Katrina. The city had problems 
not only with leadership, but also followership. Many people blamed the disaster on the 
municipal officials responsible for the maintenance of the levee system, and also blamed 
federal officials for the inadequate level of response in recovery efforts during and 
immediately following the hurricane. Because of this, the people of New Orleans were 
hesitant, if not loathe, to trust public officials and their decisions. Even if Mayor Nagin 
had taken a firm position on how the city should be rebuilt, it is questionable whether the 
people of the city would have followed and supported his leadership decisions. 
 The leadership role with respect to historic preservation post-Katrina was led by 
the Preservation Resource Center, along with the National Trust for Historic 
Preservation, which opened a field office at the PRC office. These two organizations 
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worked closely to accomplish damage assessment of hundreds of “red-tagged” 
buildings, or those deemed by the city to be beyond repair and slated for demolition. The 
National Trust organized volunteers from around the country to staff assessment teams. 
Preservation and architecture volunteers spent a week at a time in New Orleans visiting 
red-tagged buildings and making recommendations to the city on how to treat historic 
buildings. This quick action undoubtedly saved numerous buildings from demolition. The 
volunteers also advised homeowners on techniques for repair of historic houses. 
Additionally, the Preservation Resource Center increased its educational seminars after 
Katrina, teaching residents about cleaning and mold remediation. The PRC also 
provided supplies for these projects and consultants for on-site advice (PRC). The 
National Trust and the PRC served as leaders in advising and assisting property owners. 
While other civic leaders were grappling with difficult decisions about the best way to 
rebuild the city, preservation leaders were providing valuable, non-political services to 
residents who were in their own ways rebuilding their individual buildings. 
 Another factor in how places rebuild after disasters, planning and training prior to 
the disaster, can be discussed with respect to New Orleans. Even though New Orleans 
was known to be highly vulnerable to hurricane damage and prone to flooding, disaster 
planning and training were minimal prior to Katrina with respect to the numerous cultural 
resources in the city. Even the more important planning with respect to human 
evacuation and protection was clearly inadequate, as there was no plan for evacuating 
the thousands of New Orleans residents who did not own cars, or could not drive out of 
the city.  
 The last factor, sustainability, is directly applicable to New Orleans. Many experts 
argue that attempts to manage the Mississippi River by the Army Corps of Engineers are 
temporary, and that in the long-term, the river cannot be managed. They therefore 
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conclude that New Orleans is not in a sustainable location because it will require huge 
monetary and engineering efforts to protect it from future flooding (Daniels et al. 2005, 
47-53). Some experts make the case that the city should be moved to a new location; 
others claim that the city can remain in its current location, but that its footprint should be 
altered to only allow settlement in its highest and most sustainable sections. Either of 
these ideas have serious ramifications with respect to historic preservation. Moving the 
entire city would erase its 300 years of built cultural resources. Repopulating only 
portions of the city would abandon some sections that contain vernacular historic 
resources. 
 Another problem with sustainability and historic resources in New Orleans is that 
in order for many property owners to receive federal disaster aid, they must subscribe to 
the National Flood Insurance Program, which mandates certain requirements for 
buildings. One example is the mandate to elevate buildings above a certain height as 
specified by FEMA’s flood maps. The tension here between sustainability and 
preservation is that by elevating an historic building, the character and scale of the 
building is drastically changed. The tensions between sustainability and preservation will 
never be completely removed, but through research like FEMA’s publication, Integrating 
Historic Property and Cultural Resource Considerations Into Hazard Mitigation and 
Planning, cultural resources can be made more sustainable with respect to natural 
disasters. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
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 There is another thesis that could be written after this one. Actually several other 
theses could be written after this one. My original intent was to research specific and 
varied ways that people rebuild urban places following disasters. I spent the summer of 
2005 in England, and was inspired to write about cultural resources and disasters after 
visiting Plymouth. Plymouth was heavily blitzed in World War II and following the 
devastation of the bombing, the medieval city center was completely demolished to 
create a brand new city center with new buildings, a new street grid, and an entirely 
different character than the character of the pre-war Plymouth. I also read about 
Warsaw, Poland, which employed much different methods of urban planning than 
Plymouth did during and after the war. The people of Warsaw knew that the city would 
be bombed, and they carefully surveyed historic and cultural resources such as 
important buildings and monuments. When Warsaw was rebuilt, some of the completely 
destroyed buildings were painstakingly reconstructed in exactly the same place and form 
as they were prior to the war. Why were these two places rebuilt in such different ways 
following the same war? 
 When I returned to the United States in August of 2005, Hurricane Katrina 
devastated the Gulf Coast— my Gulf Coast where I was born while my dad was in flight 
school, my Gulf Coast where twenty years later I joined the Navy and went to flight 
school myself, and my Gulf Coast where I was a flight instructor for three years prior to 
attending graduate school. I am personally attached to this part of the world, especially 
New Orleans, which possesses a cultural character unlike any other American city. How 
dare Katrina mess with my Gulf Coast? The thesis that I wanted to write was about New 
Orleans. The thesis that I wanted to write was a thesis that would solve all of the 
problems of the post-Katrina New Orleans and return the flooded, devastated, 
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abandoned city to the vibrant and gritty city of live oaks and jazz and muffeletta and 
shotgun houses that I loved. Sadly, a master’s thesis in historic preservation cannot 
return New Orleans to the way it was before Katrina. Nothing can. Katrina has become a 
permanent part of the place and a benchmark in its history, and was both a tragedy and 
an opportunity for the city. Katrina was an event that carved its presence in memories 
and the built environment alike, leaving shattered minds and buildings and landscapes in 
its wake. 
 I wanted historic preservation to be a tool that people could use to help recover 
their lives in New Orleans. I wanted to write about how preservation could be this tool. 
However, in order for me to understand how historic preservation could help New 
Orleans post-Katrina, I had to learn about disaster management. I had to learn how 
preservation fit into disaster management. And that is where this project ends and 
another begins. This thesis explored the intersections between historic preservation 
policy and disaster management policy in the most general and basic way. It identified 
that cultural resources are important post-disaster; they are the jazz and the shotgun 
houses that I remember about New Orleans and want to experience when I return. They 
are the shotgun houses that wouldn’t be the same if they had to be elevated to comply 
with FEMA’s flood insurance requirements. They also wouldn’t be the same with their 
damaged wooden gingerbread cornice brackets removed or damaged wooden 
clapboard siding replaced with vinyl. They wouldn’t be the same removed from their 
streetscape of seemingly endless rows of similar houses. 
 This thesis identified that these vernacular, every-day resources are highly 
vulnerable to damage in a disaster due to their construction materials and quality. They 
are also vulnerable to demolition after a disaster because they are not necessarily 
identified on an historic register, and many are owned privately and not subject to 
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historic preservation review. Also, owners of these resources may be in lower-income 
brackets and not able to afford historically-sensitive repair or rebuilding methods and 
materials. These types of cultural resources often have no preservation organization 
responsible for evaluating them for significance, designating them on any register, or 
monitoring their maintenance and condition; they have little or no administrative integrity 
for historic preservation. 
 Administrative integrity is a theme throughout this thesis. Historic preservation 
policy in the United States in many cases does not allow for a specific entity to manage 
an historic site once it is designated. After a site is listed on the National Register of 
Historic Places there is no requirement for maintenance, monitoring, or re-evaluation 
after a certain period of time. In the case of New Orleans, many of the national historic 
districts were designated in the 1960s. In the 40 years since then, these districts have 
changed, but have not been re-evaluated for significance. New Orleans does, however, 
have strong local preservation ordinances, designated local historic districts and 
commissions, and as a Certified Local Government, has more administrative integrity 
than places with only national historic districts and no local managing agency. 
 Administrative integrity is a problem with disaster management and historic 
preservation. If there is no agency, organization, or individual responsible for managing 
vernacular cultural resources, then there will be no pre-disaster planning or mitigation. It 
will also be more difficult post-disaster to protect these resources from demolition and 
promote sensitive restoration; whatever administrative integrity was present prior to a 
disaster may be disrupted, or even completely shattered post-disaster. Federal disaster 
legislation does not explicitly allow for consideration of historic preservation. This 
consideration is only mandated through Section 106 of the NHPA. In the recent past (the 
last decade) FEMA has been working with the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation 
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(ACHP) and the National Conference of State Historic Preservation Offices (NCSHPO) 
to establish Programmatic Agreements (PA) for the treatment of cultural resources post-
disaster. These PAs allow for standardization following disasters and are advantageous 
in disaster management as each disaster experienced adds to the collective knowledge 
of how to manage a disaster better the next time. These PAs are also flexible enough to 
be tailored to each specific disaster in each specific state and/or locality. 
 A disaster is in many ways a unique problem for local managers, as many people 
may only experience one large disaster in a lifetime, or none at all. States and localities 
need advice and assistance from national disaster specialists. It is important to have 
federal or national agencies that focus on researching historic preservation and disaster 
management issues so that they can then advocate for policy, serve as a clearinghouse 
for information, and educate and train local agencies. FEMA’s Environmental and 
Historic Preservation (EHP) specialists currently perform these functions, but FEMA has 
experienced many organizational changes since September 11, 2001, and the 
permanence and stability of the EHP program are not guaranteed for the future. 
 It is also important for professional organizations such as the National Trust for 
Historic Preservation and the American Planning Association to maintain a base of 
knowledge about disasters so that when one occurs, they can assist localities in 
recovery. These national organizations should also share in responsibility with the FEMA 
EHP program for advocating for disaster preparedness and mitigation, especially in 
places that are at risk for repetitive disasters such as floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, 
and forest fires. In New Orleans, although the federal government was criticized for its 
slow response to Hurricane Katrina with respect to rescue efforts, national non-profit 
organizations were relatively quick in sending assistance in the form of both money and 
volunteers for specific efforts related to historic preservation. The NTHP organized 
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assessment teams for damaged historic buildings, the APA sent a team of experts to 
assess the city’s ability to execute planning efforts for the devastated city, and the Urban 
Land Institute presented detailed rebuilding recommendations to Mayor Nagin’s “Bring 
New Orleans Back Committee” in November of 2005, only three months after the 
hurricane.  
 Another theme of this thesis is the multi-disciplinary nature of historic 
preservation with respect to disaster management. In New Orleans, post-disaster 
planning cannot be accomplished without addressing the preservation issues of the 
richly historic built environment; planners and preservationists must work together with 
city officials and the public to not only develop a rebuilding plan, but also implement the 
plan once it is finished. Disaster managers such as FEMA staff must work with 
professionals having experience with historic buildings in order to properly assess the 
structural integrity of historic fabric post-disaster. These are only two examples, but there 
are innumerable other ways that preservationists must work with other disciplines to 
affect treatment of cultural resources. 
 Planning and mitigation pre-disaster reduce the number of resources lost after a 
disaster. The FEMA demonstration study on Milton, Pennsylvania combined a cultural 
resource survey for the town with a disaster mitigation plan. It provided Milton city 
officials as well as individual residents and property owners with guidance on mitigation 
actions for historic resources that could be performed as resources allowed. It also is a 
valuable tool for disaster responders to know how to prioritize limited resources for 
saving or rebuilding cultural resources after a disaster. If New Orleans had such a 
comprehensive plan prior to Hurricane Katrina, cultural resources in the most vulnerable 
places for flooding could have been identified and mitigation steps could have been 
taken before the disaster. These mitigation actions could range from wet- or dry-
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floodproofing for specific buildings to protecting larger areas of resources with adequate 
levees. Any mitigation action taken for cultural resources makes them more able to 
withstand the forces of disasters such as flooding or earthquakes, and therefore makes 
them more resilient and sustainable for the future. 
 One last conclusion concerning sustainability is that while preservation 
professionals should include disaster considerations when addressing sustainability of 
cultural resources, disaster managers should include cultural resources and values in 
their definitions of sustainability. Sustainability to disaster managers has been measured 
with respect to economic and ecological factors. In addition to these important factors, 
the presence of cultural resources greatly contributes to the sustainability of a place by 
enhancing quality of life, contributing to economic vitality, and as National Trust for 
Historic Preservation Richard Moe stated, “Meaningful connections with our past can 
help us plot a sure course for the future” (Moe 2006, 2). 
 In summary, there are five conclusions to this thesis, and also several possible 
areas of future study with respect to disasters and historic preservation. The conclusions 
are as follows: 
• Vernacular cultural resources are vulnerable in disaster situations. 
• There are specific roles that federal agencies and national non-profit 
organizations should play in disaster management with respect to historic 
preservation. 
• Disaster management is inherently multi-disciplinary, and many different 
professionals must work together to integrate historic preservation and disaster 
management. 
• Disaster planning and mitigation increase the resiliency of cultural resources in 
disaster situations, and should be considered by preservationists as they engage 
in preservation efforts for buildings, districts, and landscapes. 
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• Cultural resources are vital elements of our environment and must be included in 
sustainability considerations by disaster managers. 
 
The following are ideas that emerged as I was writing this thesis on topics for future 
research: 
• The general conclusions of this thesis could be more directly applied to the 
disaster response and recovery for Katrina. These lessons learned could then be 
applied to draw new conclusions about improvements to federal, state, and local 
disaster policy. Specifically, recommendations could be made on ways to include 
historic preservation concerns in the Stafford Act and other federal disaster 
legislation that currently provide no consideration for cultural resources. 
• A study similar to FEMA’s demonstration study for Milton, Pennsylvania on 
mitigation for cultural resources could be completed for New Orleans, or any 
other disaster-prone location. 
• The effects of a disaster on heritage tourism, and the ways that heritage tourism 
could help a place recover from a disaster could be studied in New Orleans, as 
much of the city’s economy was based on this type of tourism prior to Katrina. 
• The local and national historic districts in New Orleans could be re-evaluated for 
integrity and significance following the devastation of Katrina. 
• Remembrance, or memorialization of Katrina will take many forms in the future, 
and these different forms of remembrance in the built environment could be 
studied. 
• New construction in New Orleans post-Katrina could be studied for its 
relationship to the city’s rich historical architectural heritage and vocabulary and 
unique character. 
• Policy changes to the requirements of Certified Local Governments could be 
suggested, possibly requiring localities to perform disaster mitigation plans. 
• Cities that have strong preservation organizations and strong HABS/HAER 
documentation could be compared to cities having little or no preservation efforts 
and/or documentation to draw conclusions about how these efforts facilitate 
recovery and preservation after disasters. 
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• Theories of New Urbanism are most often applied to construction of new 
neighborhoods, and often disregard the history, vernacular architectural styles, 
and culture already existing in the place. The New Urbanist theories of creating 
pedestrian-friendly mixed-use communities should first of all, incorporate historic 
preservation theories and concerns, then secondly, could be applied to areas 
where devastation has not cleared a blank slate, but left many elements of the 
built environment. 
 
 There are innumerable professionals and volunteers who have been working 
tirelessly on preserving the character-defining features of New Orleans following the 
devastation of Hurricane Katrina. There are also many people working tirelessly to 
preserve the cultural landscapes of its neighborhoods. Hopefully the lessons learned in 
New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina can be incorporated into our nation’s collective 
knowledge of disaster management and historic preservation. Hopefully the lessons 
learned will encourage communities across the country to engage in multi-disciplinary 
disaster planning and mitigation in order to make our heritage of the past more 
sustainable for the future. 
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